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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of the prosecutor and the exercise of prosecutorial discretion can have an 
enormous  impact  on  the  outcome  of  criminal  proceedings.  The  exercise  of 
prosecutorial  discretion  is,  however,  often  secretive  and  misunderstood.  There 
have been concerns that a lack of accountability and transparency can result in a 
fertile bed  for  corruption. Australia has  acknowledged this  and taken steps to 
address the issue, but these measures have not come without their own costs.  
 
The concern is that these measures may, if anything, hamper the administration of 
justice and result in an inefficient criminal justice system. Indeed, these concerns 
have  been  noted  by  Singapore  who  has  hesitant  to  replicate  the  Australian 
position  for  fear  of  the  inefficiency  in  the  criminal  justice  system  that  would 
inevitably occur. 
 
Accountability  and  transparency  is  thus  weighed  up  against  the  efficient 
administration  of  justice.  Both  are  necessary  in  a  functioning  criminal  justice 
system, yet each comes at the expense of the other. This can be demonstrated by 
Professor  Herbart  Parker‘s  ‗Two  Models  of  Criminal  Processes‘  –  the  Due 
Process and Crime Control models. 
 
How then does one balance the two competing interests? As this paper will argue, 
there is no perfect system and a careful examination of a community‘s cultural 
values and the objectives of criminal justice system will be necessary to find the 
appropriate equilibrium in the balancing act of prosecutorial discretion. 
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PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION:  
A BALANCING ACT 
 
KENNY YANG
 
 
I INTRODUCTION 
 
In discussions on criminal law, there is ample literature and debate on the role of 
the Judiciary and  the laws  passed by the  Legislature. What  is  often forgotten 
however, is the role the Public Prosecutor
1 plays and the ambit of the prosecutor‘s 
discretion in the commencement and conduct of criminal proceedings. While the 
Legislature and Judiciary are subject to public scrutiny and pegged to standards of 
transparency and independence, the role of the prosecutor is often not known, and 
thus slips under the net of such scrutiny.  
 
Indeed,  as  this  paper  will  argue,  the  prosecutor  often  possesses  immense 
discretion  that  could  have  a  severe  impact  on  criminal  proceedings  and  the 
accused. As such, there is room for greater transparency and discussion on the 
issue,  but  such  transparency  comes  with  its  own  costs.  In  balancing  these 
competing interests, jurisdictions must find their ‗minimum level‘ – the minimum 
level of accountability and transparency that society finds acceptable, to instill 
confidence in the criminal justice system. 
 
This paper will put forward an analysis of the scope of the Public Prosecutor‘s 
power in the exercise of their discretion in criminal matters. It will first introduce 
prosecutorial discretion and its role in the criminal justice system. The paper then 
seeks  to  illustrate  the  nature  of  prosecutorial  discretion  by  comparing  the 
                                                 
  LLB (Hons, First Class), GDLP (Australian National University). I‘d like to thank Lorraine 
Finlay at the School of Law, Murdoch University, for her expertise and advice in the production of 
this paper. All errors are my own. 
1 The precise term used to define the role may differ depending on the jurisdiction. In Australia, 
prosecutorial  functions  are  carried  out  by  ‗State  Prosecutors‘  or  ‗Police  Prosecutors‘  and  are 
directed by a ‗Director of Public Prosecution‘. In Singapore, similar functions are carried out by 
‗Deputy Public Prosecutors‘ or ‗Assistant Public Prosecutors‘ who assist the Attorney-General in 
his role as the ‗Public Prosecutor‘. For the purposes of this paper, the term ‗prosecutor‘ will be 
used to refer to government officials vested with the authority to initiate and conduct criminal 
proceedings. 2 
 
Australian and Singaporean approaches. These two jurisdictions illustrate the two 
models of criminal process proposed by Professor Herbert Parker in his paper 
‗Two Models of the Criminal Process‘.
2 
 
To  understand  these  two  approaches  the  paper  will  look  at  the  historical 
developments that resulted in the establishment of independent Director of Public 
Prosecutions  (‗DPP‘)  in  Australia  that  aims  to  be  independent,  fair  and 
accountable. It will also examine the Singaporean system of prosecutions with the 
Attorney-General constitutionally empowered as the Public Prosecutor.  
 
The paper will then turn to a discussion of how the prosecutorial discretion in 
Australia has, if anything, grown over the years, especially given the increasing 
tendency by the legislature to include mandatory sentencing in statutory offences. 
This displacement of discretion has essentially shifted power from the Judiciary 
and Legislature to the Executive office of the Public Prosecutor. This can also be 
seen in Singapore, where the existence of the mandatory death penalty results in 
the discretion of life and death residing not with the Judiciary, but with the Public 
Prosecutor.  
 
The second part of this paper will look at the measures Australia has instituted to 
facilitate  transparency  and  accountability.  It  will  then  compare  the  Australian 
position  with  Singapore‘s  pragmatic  model  that  has  traditionally  not  seen  the 
same attempts at instituting publicly visible safeguards to guide the exercise of 
the prosecutorial discretion and what benefits this model may offer. 
 
This paper will conclude that the appropriate level of discretion vested in the 
Public Prosecutor will inevitably require a careful examination of each system‘s 
own values and objectives of its criminal justice system. Each model offers its 
own benefits, but comes at a cost. No model is perfect and indeed, each system 
must from time to time calibrate the level of discretion afforded to prosecutors to 
balance on the one hand, the efficient administration of justice, and on the other, 
the considerations of transparency and accountability. 
                                                 
2 Herbert L Parker, Two Models of the Criminal Process (1964) 113 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review 1. 3 
 
 
II THE PROSECUTOR‘S ROLE IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
 
A Checks and Balances 
 
Western-liberalists have long accepted that a government with unchecked powers 
increases  the  likelihood  of  abuse  of  those  powers.  A  system  of  checks  and 
balances exists to ensure that the powers of the State are exercised appropriately 
and only when necessary. In the words of Montesquieu, ‗there is no liberty, if the 
judicial power be not separated from the executive and legislative‘.
3 
 
The  separation  of  powers  doctrine  thus  divests  state  power  in  three  separate 
branches: the Executive, the Legislature and the Judiciary, each acting ‗as the 
means  of keeping each  other in  their proper places‘. While this  separation of 
powers is important in all facets of governance and law, it is arguably even more 
so in matters of criminal law as this affects the liberty and life of individuals. 
 
It is in the criminal law where one is able to witness the ‗fascinating inter-play 
between the different branches of government‘.
4  
 
The Legislature makes the laws which define what a crime is, and which also 
prescribes  what  the  processes  should  be;  the  Executive  runs the  enforcement 
machinery  from  detection  and  investigation  to  prosecution;  and  the  Judiciary 
adjudicates guilt or innocence, and, if necessary, the punishment, on the material 
presented to it by the prosecution and the defendant; the Executive once again 
takes over and carries out the sentence of the court.
5   
 
From  the  completion  of  an  offence  to  conviction  and  sentencing,  the  ball  of 
control first starts with the Legislature, made up of elected officials, to define the 
necessary elements of an offence. It then passes to the Executive for investigation 
and  prosecution  and  finally  to  the  Judiciary,  made  up  of  appointed  judicial 
                                                 
3  Montesquieu,  The  Spirit  of  the  Laws  (Thomas Nugent  trans, 1949)  51;  James  Madison,  The 
Federalist No 51 (1961) 347. 
4 Michael Hor, ‗The Independence of the Criminal Justice System in Singapore‘ [2002] Singapore 
Journal of Legal Studies 497, 497. 
5 Ibid. 4 
 
officers who are, in an ideal system, given independence and are thus free from 
influence of the other two branches. It is the Executive control of this process and, 
within it, the exercise of the prosecutor‘s power and discretion that this paper is 
concerned about. 
 
B The Public Prosecutor’s Role 
 
In  Australia,  prosecutorial  functions  were  traditionally  carried  out  by  the 
Attorney-General.  Today,  this  role  has  fallen  to  the  Directors  of  Public 
Prosecutions  of  the  States  and  the  Commonwealth,  through  the  respective 
enabling legislation.
6 While the precise term may vary across jurisdictions, there 
is  usually  provision  for  a  ‗Public  Prosecutor‘,
7  whose  primary  function  is  to 
prosecute  offences  against  the  law  of  the  land.  In  carrying  out  this  duty,  the 
prosecutor  has  to  make  certain  decisions.  This  includes  whether  or  not  to 
prosecute, and if so, to choose from the plethora of available charges arising from 
the same set of facts. The prosecutor also assists the court by making submissions 
fairly and in an even handed manner,
8 which may include applications on points 
of  the  criminal  process  from  pre -trial  hearings  through  to  the  trial  itself, 
sentencing and appeals on both conviction and sentence, if necessary.
9  
 
In the exercise of these functions, the prosecutor is meant to act fairly in seeking 
the truth and to represent the community rather than any individual or sectional 
interest.
10  While the prosecutor is the adversary of the accused in our adversarial 
system,
11  the  prosecutor  as  ‗minister  for  justice‘
12  is  not  entitled  to  act  as  if 
representing private interests in litigation.  A prosecutor ‗acts independently, yet 
in the public interest‘.
13 The role of the public prosecutor is not to push for a 
                                                 
6 Rod Harvey, ‗The Independence of the Prosecutor: A Police Perspective‘ (Paper presented at the 
Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Melbourne, 18 April 1996) 5. 
7 See footnote 1. 
8 R v Tait and Bartley (1979) 46 ALR 473, 477; David Ross, Crime (Lawbook, 2
nd ed, 2004) 749. 
9 R v Allpass (1993) 72 A Crim R 561. 
10 Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334; Eric Colvin and John McKechnie,  Criminal Law in 
Queensland and Western Australia: Cases and Commentary (LexisNexis, 5
th Ed 2008) 739.  
11 R v Karounos (1995) 63 SASR 452, 465-6, 493. 
12 Harvey, above n 6. 
13 Critics have however mentioned that these concepts are ‗so diffuse and elastic that they do not 
constrain prosecutors much‘, see Stephanos Bibas, ‗Prosecutorial Regulations versus Prosecutorial 
Accountability‘ (2009) 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 959, 961. 5 
 
conviction,
14 but to assist the court in arriving at the truth.
15 A prosecutor does not 
represent a particular client,
16 but serves the community and, in doing so, must act 
in the spirit of fairness. To this extent, the accused and the community can expect 
that the prosecutor ‗will act with fairness and detachment and always with the 
objectives  of  establishing  the  whole  truth  in  accordance  with  procedures  and 
standards which the law requires to be observed and of helping to ensure that the 
accused‘s trial is a fair one‘.
17 
 
C Ball Passing 
 
At a cursory glance, this ‗ball-passing‘ of control from one branch of government 
to the other ensures that each is accountable to the other and reduces the risk of 
one branch being overly influenced by another. While the Westminster model of 
governance  has  accepted  that  some  overlap  between  the  Legislature  and 
Executive cannot be avoided,
18 the Judiciary remains separate and independent. 
This ensures that the risk of abuse is minimized and the liberty and rights of 
individuals are protected.
19  
 
However, upon closer examination,  the  Executive‘s  role  and  specifically,  the 
prosecutor‘s position is one of a special nature – it essentially forms the bridge 
that links the Legislature‘s definition of an offence to the Judiciary‘s adjudication 
of guilt or innocence. As the two institutions are independent of each other, it is 
up to the prosecutor, upon receiving the ‗ball‘, to decide when, how, and indeed 
whether or not to pass said ‗ball‘ to the Judiciary for adjudication. 
 
The special position the prosecutor is in is arguably compounded given that the 
Judiciary in the adversarial common law system, while having final authority in 
                                                 
14 Yeo, Staney, Stanley Yeo, Neil Morgan and Chan Wing Cheong, Criminal Law in Malaysia and 
Singapore (LexisNexis, 2
nd Ed, 2012) 28. 
15 Colvin and McKechnie, above n 10. 
16 Harvey, above n 6. 
17 Whitehorn v The Queen (1983) 152 CLR 657, 663. This includes avoiding the use of temperate 
or emotive language which may prejudice the jury – see  Livermore v R [2006] NSWCCA 334 
where the Court took objection to the prosecution repeatedly referring to a witness as ‗an idiot‘, 
cited in Colvin and McKechnie, above n 10, 740. 
18 Stanley de Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions (Stevens, 1964) 131-149. 
19 Hor, above n 4. 6 
 
deciding the matter, is only a passive adjudicator,
20 having a limited role in the 
commencement  and  conduct  of  criminal  proceedings.  For  practical  and 
constitutional reasons, it is neither expected, nor desired, that the courts play a 
more inquisitorial role in an adversarial system.
21 As such, the court can only 
consider matters that have been brought before it, based on materials presented by 
both parties.
22 The courts are also constrained in having to deal with the cases 
before  it  on  a  case -by-case  basis,  affording  each  the  full  attention  and 
consideration of the court.
23  
 
While the prosecutor has some limitations  -  for example, in Singapore and 
Australia  it  is  we ll  accepted  that  a  prosecutor  should  play  no  role  in  the 
investigation of offences and is thus reliant on enforcement and investigative 
authorities to pursue matters  - the prosecutor does play an important role in the 
pre-trial decision making process and  in court. He/she decides whether or not to 
proceed on charges and which charges to proceed on. If proceeding on a matter, 
he acts as an advocate before the court, selecting which materials to present and in 
doing so, is given great leeway in deciding the f orm of such presentation, or 
indeed whether the case at hand warrants such presentation.
24 More than a passive 
receiver of workload, the prosecutor ‗screens‘ cases and decides which are worthy 
of  proceeding  on  and  to  what  extent.  The  prosecutor‘s  importance  within  the 
criminal justice system cannot be overestimated.
25 
 
   
                                                 
20 William A Hamilton and Charles R Work, ‗The Prosecutor‘s Role in the Urban Court System: 
The Case for Management Consciousness‘ (1973) 64 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 
183. 
21 Michael  A Simons,  ‗Prosecutorial Discretion and Prosecution Guidelines:  A  Case Study in 
Controlling Federalization‘ (2002) 75 New York University Law Review 893, 897. 
22 Hamilton and Work, above n 20. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Bibas, above n 13. 7 
 
D Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
The Macquarie Dictionary defines discretion as the ‗power or right of deciding, or 
of acting according to one‘s own judgment; freedom of judgment or choice.‘
26 In 
the context of a prosecutor‘s discretion, this refers to the wide scope given to 
commence, conduct, direct, take over and conduct criminal proceedings on behalf 
of the State, as its advocate.
27According to Davis: 
 
Discretion is indispensable for the individualization of justice (governments of 
laws and men). It is necessary as rules alone cannot cope with the complexities of 
modern  government…Where  law  ends,  discretion  begins  and  the  exercise  of 
discretion may mean beneficence or tyranny, justice or injustice, reasonableness 
or arbitrariness.
28 
 
Whatever its origins, discretion now ‗pervades all facets of the administration of 
justice‘.
29  While  it  has  been  accepted  that  a  degree  of  discretion  in  decision 
making is required,
30 these decisions can have a significant impact on a defendant 
and reverberate through every component of the criminal justice system.
31 They 
can mean the difference between justice and injustice. Prosecutorial discretion is 
indeed ‗at the heart of the State‘s criminal justice system‘.
32  
 
In  a  straightforward  shoplifting  incident  for  example,  where  the  only  offence 
possible is stealing, the prosecutor may simply have to make a choice whether or 
                                                 
26 Susan Butler (ed), Macquarie Dictionary (Macquarie, 5
th ed, 2009) 479; Richard Refshauge, 
‗Prosecutorial  Discretion  –  Australia‘  in  Gabriël  A  Moens  and  Rodolphe  Biffot  (eds),  The 
Convergence of Legal Systems in the 21
st Century (CopyRight Publishing, 2002) 353, 358. The 
Concise Australian Legal Dictionary defines discretion as ‗the power or authority of a decision 
maker to choose between alternatives, or to choose no alternative‘, see Peter Butt (ed), Concise 
Australian Legal Dictionary (LexisNexis, 3
rd ed, 2004) 130. 
27 George T Felkenes, ‗The Prosecutor: A Look at Reality‘ (1975) 7 Southwestern University Law 
Review 98, 98. 
28 K Davis, Police Discretion (West Publishing, 1975) 12. 
29 Sidney I Lezak and Maureen Leonard, ‗The Prosecutor‘s Discretion: Out of the Closet, Not Out 
of Control‘ in Carl F Pinkele and William C Louthan (eds), Discretion, Justice and Democracy: A 
Public Policy Perspective (1985) 44-5. 
30 In the United States, it has been recognized that prosecutorial discretion is a necessary aspect of 
the justice system, see  United States v Armstrong, 116 S Ct 1489 (1996); Anne Bowen Poulin, 
‗Prosecutorial Discretion and Selective Prosecution: Enforcing Protection after United States v 
Armstrong‘ (1997) 34 American Criminal Law Review 1071, 1079. 
31 Felkenes, above n 27. 
32 Kenneth Culp Davis, Discretionary Justice (1969) 170. Also cited in McCleskey v Kemp, 481 
US 279, 297, 312 (1987). 8 
 
not to proceed with prosecution.
33 However, in more complicated matters where 
some force has been used in the commission of the offence, the prosecutor has to 
decide  whether  to  proceed  with  stealing,  robbery  (or  possibly  aggravated 
robbery).
34  Similarly, in an altercation between individuals where the level of 
injuries  suffered  may  vary,  a  number  of  char ges  may  be  open:  a  common 
assault,
35  assault  occasioning  bodily  harm,
36  grievous  bodily  harm
37  and/or 
wounding.
38  The prosecutor may select from the menu of offences which to 
proceed with. The prosecutor‘s discretion can be said to extend to the following: 
the decision whether or not to commence or continue a prosecution, and if so, 
which charges should be laid, and decisions as to the conduct of proceedings – 
which  witnesses  to  call,  what  material  to  be  presented  and  a  range  of  other 
decisions regarding the conduct of the case.
39 
 
Some discretion must inevitably be vested in the prosecutor. The State‘s resources 
are  finite  and  the  prosecutor  performs  a  vital  function  by  precluding  random 
access to the courts and to its limited adjudicative resources, preserving  these 
resources for the timely judgment of the matters to which the public attaches 
priority.
40  It is in this sense that  the  prosecutor, acting in the interests of the 
public, serves as  guardian, protector and custodian of the community‘s scarce 
resources  for  adjudication.
41  This  has  been  referred  to  as  the  ‗[p]rosecutor‘s 
intelligent use of court [and state] resources.‘
42 The prosecutor is at the end of the 
day,  a Public Servant,  funded by the  State and thus  has  a duty to  ensure the 
                                                 
33 This scenario was laid out in Yeo, Morgan and Cheong above n 14, 29. 
34 For example, in Western Australia the offence of robbery encapsulates that of stealing, but 
includes a degree of violence at, during or immediately after the stealing. See  Criminal Code of 
Western Australia ss370-1 Cf Criminal Code of Western Australia ss 391-2 which stipulates that a 
person who steals a thing and, immediately before or at the time of or immediately after doing so, 
uses or threatens to use violence to any person or property in order to obtain the thing stolen or to 
prevent  or  overcome  resistance  to  its  being  stolen  commits  a  robbery.  See  Criminal  Code  of 
Western Australia s 391 for ‗circumstances of aggravation‘. 
35 Criminal Code of Western Australia ss 222, 313. 
36 Ibid s 317. 
37 Ibid s 297. 
38 Ibid s 301. 
39 Refshauge, above n 26; Michael Rozenes, ‗Prosecutorial Discretion in Australia Today‘ (Paper 
delivered at the Australian Institute of Criminology Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Melbourne, 
18-19 April 1996). 
40 Hamilton and Work, above n 20, 184. 
41 Ibid. 
42 Ibid. 9 
 
efficient use of tax payer‘s dollars and State resources.
43 A degree of discretion is 
necessary  to  facilitate  compromise  and  expediency  in  the  criminal  justice 
process.
44  
 
E Gate Keeper of the Criminal Justice System 
 
One would think that criminal trials, having the potential to deprive a defendant 
of liberty  and indeed in some jurisdictions,  life, would necessitate  a stringent 
process before conviction, ideally before a jury of the defendant‘s peers. This 
notion is however, as some would put it, a ‗romantic view‘ of the criminal law.
45 
In reality, most decisions are made before the matter is put to trial.
46 This is the 
result of the considerable discretion afforded to the prosecutor in the pre -trial 
decision making process. In practice, this has translated into the outcome of a 
criminal trial being heavily affected by the decisions of a prosecutor who, in the 
words of then US Attorney General Robert Jackson, ‗has more control over life, 
liberty  and reputation  than any other person‘.
47 The term  ‗gate-keeper‘  of the 
criminal justice system is thus not an inaccurate label for the prosecutor.
 48 
 
                                                 
43 Vicki Waye and Paul Marcus, ‗Australia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice 
System Uncommonly at Odds, Part 2‘ (2010) 18 Tulane Journal of International and Comparative 
Law 335, 340. 
44 Mark Findlay, Criminal Law: Problems in Context (Oxford University Press, 2
nd ed, 2006) 41. 
45 F Andrew Hessick III and Reshma M Saujani, ‗Plea Bargaining and Convicting the Innocent: 
the Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel and the Judge‘ (2002) Brigham Young University 
Journal of Public Law 189, 189. 
46 Findlay, above n 44. 
47 Robert H Jackson, ‗The Federal Prosecutor‘ (1940) 24 Journal of American Judicature Society 
18. See also comments such as ‗no government official…has as much unreviewable power and 
discretion as the prosecutor‘ in Bibas, above n 13, and ‗no government official can effect a greater 
influence over a citizen than the prosecutor who charges that citizen with a crime‘ in Kenneth J 
Melilli, ‗Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversarial System‘ (1992) 3 Brigham Young University 
Law Review 669, 671. 
48 A phrase referred to by The Justice Committee, United Kingdom House of Commons,  The 
Crown Prosecution Service: Gatekeeper of the Criminal Justice System (2009) 3. A number of 
commentators have also used the term. See Felkenes, above n 27; Federick W Gay, ‗Restorative 
Justice and the Prosecutor‘ (2000) 27 Fordham Urban Law Review 1651; Laurie L Levenson, 
‗Workingoutside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of Federal Prosecutors‘ (1999) 26 
Fordham Urban law Review 553; Bennett L Gershman, ‗A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor‘s 
Exercise of the Charging Decision (1993) 20 Fordham Urban Law Review 513; Cassia Spohn and 
David Holleran, ‗Prosecuting Sexual Assault: A Comparison of Charging Decisions in Sexual 
Assault  Cases  Involving  Strangers,  Acquaintances  and  Intimate  Partners‘  (2001)  18  Justice 
Quarterly 651; James C Backstrom, ‗The Role of the Prosecutor in Juvenile Justice: Advocacy in 
the Courtroom and Leadership in the Community‘ (1999) 50 South Carolina Law Review 699. 10 
 
Given the immense discretion a prosecutor is given in the commencement and 
conduct of criminal proceedings and its corresponding effect on the accused, it is 
a  strange  state  of  affairs  that  the  role  of  the  prosecutor  is  often  ‗forgotten  in 
discussions of the criminal justice system‘. 
49 As highlighted in a report by the 
Australian Institute of Criminology: 
 
[t]he exercise of prosecutorial discretion is one of the most important but least 
understood aspects in the administration of criminal justice. The considerable 
discretionary powers vested in prosecutors employed by the state and territory 
Offices of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) are exercised in accordance 
with  prosecution  policies  and  guidelines,  but  the  decision  making  process  is 
rarely subject to external scrutiny
50  
 
Grosman notes that little is known about the powers exercised by prosecutors and 
the factors which influence their exercise of discretion.
51 Legislative provisions 
which define the powers, duties and functions of the prosecutor are significantly 
absent.
52 Judicial pronouncements, if any, are largely confined to the prosecutor‘s 
behavior in the courtroom.
53 This trend, acknowledged by Sallmann and Willis, is 
a situation disturbing in any society which purports to embrace liberal, democratic 
principles and ideas.
54 However, in order to better understand the nature of the 
prosecutor and the independence or lack thereof, of the exercise of its discretion, 
it is first useful to look at the development of the prosecution service and how it 
arrived in its current form. 
 
   
                                                 
49 Hamilton and Work, above n 20. 
50 Denise Lievore, ‗Victim Credibility in Adult Sexual Assault Cases‘ [2004] (288) Trends and 
Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice 1. 
51 B A Grosman, The Prosecutor (University of Toronto Press, 1969) 3. 
52 Ibid. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Peter Sallmann and John Willis, Criminal Justice in Australia (Oxford University Press, 1984) 
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III TWO SYSTEMS OF PROSECUTIONS ILLUSTRATED 
 
A The Development of Prosecutions in Australia 
 
Different  legal  cultures  have  developed  varying  approaches  in  dealing  with 
individuals who break the laws set down by the State and society.
55 In the trial of 
Socrates, as depicted in ‗The Crito‘, the decision to prosecute Socrates was made 
by a trio of private citizens: a politician, a poet and a rhetorician.
56 In another well 
known trial four hundred years later, Pontius Pilate first found no basis for a 
charge against Jesus but later left his prosecution to a crowd. In various criminal 
justice systems today, the majority of prosecutions will be State sanctioned, 
initiated by the State ‗in the public interest‘,
57 with official State prosecutors at 
the helm.
58 In Japan, which does not recognize any offence unless prosecution is 
undertaken  by  the  State,  this  has  been  described  as  a  ‗monopolization  of 
prosecution‘.
59  While  some  jurisdictions  make  limited  provisions  for  private 
prosecutions,
60  these are few and far in -between  –  the  reality  of  the  criminal 
justice  system  is  that  prosecution  is  an  arena  dominated  by  the  State  and  its 
prosecutors.
61 
                                                 
55 Mark West, ‗Prosecution Review Commissions: Japan‘s Answer to the Problem of Prosecutorial 
Discretion‘ (1992) 92 Colombia Law Review 684. 
56 Justin D Kaplan, Introductory Note to Dialogues of Plato 2 (Jowett trans 1950), cited in West, 
above n 55. 
57 United Kingdom, Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 29 January 1951, vol 483, col 
681, (Sir Hartley Shawcross, Attorney-General). 
58 Jeremy Gans, Modern Criminal Law of Australia (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 57. 
59 Francis Tseng, ‗Enhancement of the Rule of Law and Promotion of the Public Interest – The 
Role  and  Function  of  the  Prosecution  System  in  Singapore‘  (Paper  presented  at  the  107
th 
International  Training  Course:  The  Role  and  Function  of  Prosecution  in  Criminal  Justice, 
The United Nations Asia and Far East Institute for the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of 
Offenders, 1 September to 21 November 1997).  
60 In Australia for example, this is provided for by  The Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s13.  In Western 
Australia, private prosecution has since been discontinued – the Director of Public Prosecutions 
thus  has  full  conduct  of  criminal  matters  in  the  State,  see  Western  Australia,  Parliamentary 
Debates,  Legislative  Council,  27  Oct  2004,  7328  (Second  Reading  Speech  of  the  Criminal 
Procedure Bill 2004). In Singapore, private prosecution can be done by way of a Magistrate‘s 
Complaint, see Subordinate Courts Working Paper Committee, Complaints to Magistrates (1999) 
Subordinate Courts of Singapore   
<http://www.lawnet.com.sg/legal/ln2/comm/PDF/complaints.pdf>.  See  also  the  comments  of 
Yong CJ in Cheng William v Loo Ngee Long Edmund [2001] 2 SLR(R) 626 [16]. For British 
examples, see Richard J Stafford, Private Prosecutions (Shaw & Sons, 1989) 181-187; Irving R 
Kaufman,  ‗Criminal  Procedure  in  England  and  the  United  States:  Comparisons  in  Initiating 
Prosecutions‘ (1980) 49 Fordham Law Review 26, 28, 30 and the Prosecution of Offences Act 
1985 (UK), s6(1) which preserves the power to instigate private prosecutions. 
61 Gans, above n 58. 12 
 
 
In Australia, prior to 1982, prosecutions were conducted along the same vein as 
the  English  tradition  where  it  was  private  citizens  and  the  police,  acting  as 
citizens  and  not  representatives  of  the  State,  who  commenced  and  conducted 
prosecutions.
62 This however, was not ideal as private prosecutions imposed a 
significant burden on the private citizen acting as prosecutor.
63 This also led to an 
element  of  arbitrariness  as  whether  an  offender  was  ultimately  prosecuted 
depended on the victim‘s willingness to commence a prosecution. Thus, while the 
right to initiate private prosecutions remained under the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth),
64 
upon the statutory establishment of a police force, the police took over the vast 
majority of prosecution of offences.
65  
 
1 The Call for Separation 
 
This  was  however,  still  unsatisfactory  given  that  the  prosecution  was  often 
undertaken by the police investigator without reference or consultation with the 
prosecuting authority.
66 The concept of a police prosecutor is problematic as the 
person who investigates the crime is seen as having an interest in seeing the case 
proceed. Also disconcerting was the fact  that the prosecution service then was 
seen to be part of government, giving rise to the question of the independence.
67 
The prospect of a prosecution service entirely independent of the government and 
the police was rare, but one that has been described as  being ‗eminently sensible 
if  one  wanted  to  remove  prosecutions  and  prosecutorial  decisions  from  the 
                                                 
62 According to Williams, ‗[p]rosecution by private people was frequent and important before the 
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717, 729. 
64 Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) s 13. 
65 Refshauge, above n 26. 
66 Damian Bugg, ‗The  Role of the DPP in the 20
th Century‘ (Paper presented at the Judicial 
Conference of Australia, Melbourne, 13 November 1999).  
67 G E Fitzgerald,  Commission of inquiry into Possible Illegal Activities and Associated Police 
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political process.‘
68 Some saw a need to remove the Attorney-General (who until 
that time was responsible for the commencement and conduct of prosecutions), an 
elected member of the Legislature, from the prosecution process to ensure true 
independence  from  day  to  day  politics  of  government.
69  As  noted  by  John 
Coldrey: 
 
[A]    major    problem  exists    when  the    prosecutorial  discretion    must    be  
exercised  in  controversial  or  politically sensitive circumstances. There is a real 
potential  that  such  decisions  will    become  subject  to    distortion    or  
misconstruction  if  they  are  drawn  into  the  ambit  of  party political debate or 
alternatively,  will  be  perceived  as  having  been  motivated  by  political 
partisanship. It is not to the point that such assertions aid perceptions may be 
factually  groundless.  The  damage  that  is  created  is  that  the  necessary  public 
confidence in the administration of the criminal law will be eroded.
70  
 
In addition to the perceived lack of independence, the prosecution service suffered 
from a myriad of issues and was accordingly criticized: 
 
In  the  late  1970s  and  early  1980s  it  became  increasingly  apparent  that  the 
Commonwealth prosecution process was fraught with delay and inefficiencies. 
Matters  came  to  a  head  with  the  widespread  debate  concerning  some  of  the 
revelations contained in the first Costigan Report. In particular, in that report the 
Royal Commissioner outlined what he described as the ‗lamentable history of 
non-prosecution‘  which  occurred  in  the  Perth  Office  of  the  Deputy  Crown 
Solicitor in relation to a ‗bottom-of-the-harbour‘ tax prosecution which came to 
the attention of the Australian Taxation Office almost a decade earlier and still 
                                                 
68 Jeremy W Rapke, ‗ODPP Vic 25
th Anniversary Dinner Speech‘ (Speech delivered at the Office 
of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (Victoria)  25
th  Anniversary  Dinner,  Parliament  House, 
Melbourne, 27 October 2008) 
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Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  25
th  Anniversary  Dinner,  Old  Parliament  House,  Canberra,  5 
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70  Geoffrey  Flatman,  ‗The  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions:  Independence 
Professionalism and Accountability‘ (Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Criminology 
Conference: Prosecuting Justice, Independence of the Prosecutor, Melbourne, 18-19 April 1996) 
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required prosecution attention. It is also clear that in the federal sphere in recent 
years  crime  has  become  much  more  complex,  and  for  that  reason  traditional 
responses have been rendered inappropriate.
71 
 
Similarly, in a 1980 report by the Australian Law Reform Commission, it was 
noted that: 
 
[t]he  process  of  prosecutions  in  Australia  at  both  State  and  Federal  level  is 
probably the most secretive, least understood and most poorly documented aspect 
of the administration of criminal justice.
72 
 
This remark, ‗not wide off the mark‘,
73 alluded to the lack of consistent, publicly 
available guidelines and policies to guide the exercise of discretion and power of 
the  prosecutor.  The  report  recommended  the  establishment  of  policies  to  be 
adopted by prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion whether or not to initiate 
criminal  proceedings  and  in  reviewing  and  settling  charges.
74  The report also 
recommended that such policies be made publicly available to be ‗reviewed and 
criticized where appropriate‘,
75 for a restructuring of the charging process and for 
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System, Australia Institute of Criminology, Canberra, 22-23 March 1999) 11-12. See also, New 
South Wales Office of Public Management, ‗Transfer of certain prosecution functions from the 
police  to  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (Report,  New  South  Wales  Office  of  Public 
Management,1989); A Sanders, ‗An Independent  Crown  Prosecution Service‘ (1986) 153  The 
Criminal Law Review 16. 
73 Bugg, above n 66. 
74 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 72, [103]. 
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the charge bargaining system to be further examined and made more visible.
76 
These comments demonstrate the lack of a ‗minimum level‘ of transparency and 
accountability that is necessary if public confidence in the criminal justice system 
is to be guaranteed. 
 
2 The Independent Prosecutor: Fair and Accountable 
 
Attempts  were  thus  made  to  establish  an  independent  prosecution  service.  In 
Tasmania, this  was  done via the Crown Advocate under the  Crown  Advocate 
Act.
77 The Act however, failed to provide guidance on the relationship between 
the offices  of  the Crown Advocate, the Attorney -General  and  the Solicitor -
General.
78 Additionally, it did not allow for the Crown Advocate to publish or 
issue prosecution guidelines which would have ensured some form of consistency 
and provided guidance in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to other agencies 
with prosecution powers.
79 It was only later in Victoria that the Director of Public 
Prosecutions  (‗the  DPP‘)  was  born,
80  with  most  of  the  Attorney -General‘s 
functions in matters of criminal prosecution transferred to that Office.
81 This was 
later followed by the establishment of the Commonwealth‘s Office of Director of 
Public Prosecutions through the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 (Cth).
82 
 
This was followed by the remaining States each establishing their own DPP under 
local  legislation.
83  The  Offices  were  enacted  with  powers  to  commence 
prosecutions,
84 take over the conduct of prosecutions or terminate prosecutions,
85 
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80  Ibid. John Harber Phillips was appointed as the first Director of Public Prosecutions for 
Victoria, see Rapke, above n 68.  
81 Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1982 (Vic). 
82 Refshauge, above n 26, 355.  Ian Temby was the inaugal Commonwealth Director of Public 
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enter a nolle prosequi,
86 but perhaps most importantly, addressing the issue that 
the Tasmania‘s earlier experiment did not, the Acts allowed the DPPs to publish 
guidelines and to give directions to other prosecuting officials.
87 This laid the 
foundation for an independent prosecution service exercising consistency and 
transparency in the course of their duties, not least of all in the exercise of their 
prosecutorial discretion. The objective of establishing the Office of the DPP can 
be seen in a comment made by Kirby P:  
 
What is the object of having a Director of Public Prosecutions? Obviously it is to 
ensure that a high degree of independence in the vital task of making prosecution 
decisions in exercising prosecution discretion… Decisions to commence, not to 
commence or to terminate a prosecution are made independently of the courts. 
Yet they can have the greatest consequences for the application of the criminal 
law. It was to ensure that in certain cases manifest integrity and neutrality were 
brought  to  bear  upon  the  prosecutorial  decisions  that  the  Act  was  passed  by 
Parliament affording large and important powers to the DPP who, by the Act, 
was given a very high measure of independence.
88  
 
Kirby‘s comment referred to the political independence (or lack thereof) of the 
prosecution  service  and  the  desire  for  a  less  ‗secretive,  poorly  understood‘
89 
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88 Price v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704, 708 (Kirby P). Kirby P also made reference to the 
Australian Law Reform Commission, Sentencing of Federal Offenders, Report No 15 (1980) in 
his remarks. 
89 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 72, 61. 17 
 
process in prosecution, given the impact the exercise of prosecutorial decision has 
on stakeholders within the criminal justice system. These factors thus culminated 
into the Office of the DPP with the notion that the conduct of prosecutions in 
Australia would be independent, fair and accountable.
90 
 
3 The Hybrid System: A Compromise? 
 
Despite the historical developments outlined above depicting a clear desire for an 
independent  and  impartial  prosecution  services,  legally  qualified  practitioners 
employed by the Office of the DPP are only deployed in serious matters, before 
superior  Courts.
91  In minor matters such as thefts, drink driving  and  minor 
assaults before  the lower courts, the majority of prosecutions are still being 
conducted by police prosecutors,
92  who may have some training in law and 
advocacy,
93 but need not necessarily be legally qualified.
94  
 
Commentators have noted the oddity of this system,
95  citing several obvious 
inherent weaknesses. The paralegal police prosecutor, not legally qualified, is not 
subject to the ethical standards that govern those admitted to the bar.
96 Similarly, 
as non-legal practitioners, they are unable to claim professiona l privilege over 
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their communications.
97 Furthermore, prosecutorial functions risk being tainted 
by  corruption  that  has  on  occasion,  surfaced  within  the  police  service.
98 
Additionally, the issue of competence and training can be called into question. 
While some measures have been taken to ensure competency in prosecution at 
trial,
99 the training currently provided for the police prosecutor is inadequate and 
only allows for a few weeks to learn the fundamentals of prosecuting and the 
legal system, with much of the work to be learned on-the-job.
100  
 
The question of independence has also not been resolved. As the Lusher report  
notes,
101  even  if  police  prosecutors  were  legally  qualified,  it  would  still  be 
inappropriate for them to conduct prosecutions as it breache s the principle of 
independence.
102  By  combining  the  functions  of  policing,  investigation  and 
prosecution,  it  becomes  harder  to  dispel  the  belief  that  everyone  who  is 
apprehended by the police for a criminal offence will be prosecuted.
103  The 
concern here is as m uch with impartiality as the  appearance of impartiality,
104 
which is greatly diminished if the police continue to have a role in the conduct of 
prosecutions. 
 
While it was envisioned that the respective DPPs would have broad powers over 
prosecutions, these were not without limit. Initially in Western Australia, the 
wording of section 12 of the  Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) 
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made no provision permitting the DPP to conduct summary prosecutions, leaving 
this  area  exclusively  to  the  police.  This  has  since  been  amended  by  inserting 
section 11 to allow the DPP to commence and conduct the prosecution of any 
offence, whether indictable or not.
105 
 
Similarly, in Queensland, under the  Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 
(Qld), ‗criminal proceedings are defined to mean proceedings on indictment and 
certain proceedings in the Supreme Court commenced by a person charged with 
an  indictable  offence‘.
106  Thus,  while  the  DPP  is  empowered  to  commence, 
institute  and  conduct  criminal  proceedings  at  the  indictable  level,  and  where 
necessary,  take  over  and  conduct  proceedings  at  the  summary  level,
107  these 
powers, as Refshauge points out, do not extend to initiating prosec utions at the 
summary level.
108  
 
To the credit of the Directors of Public Prosecution, and the police, despite this 
‗hybrid  system‘,  the  integrity  and  independence  of  the  Australian  prosecution 
service  from  the  governmental  politics  and  police  tampering  is  preserved. 
Unflinching prosecution of high profile political bribery matters helped reassure 
the  community  that  prosecution  was  undertaken  by  officers  who  were  not 
susceptible to political influence.
109 For example, in 1992, just two days after the 
Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (WA) was passed, John McKechnie, the 
then DPP for Western Australia, initiated contempt proceedings against a serving 
Minister in the Lawrence Government.
110  Additionally, McKechnie noted the 
Western Australian prosecution service have since prosecuted at least two former 
Premiers  (Liberal  and  Labor),  a  former  Deputy  Premier  and  Member  of 
Parliament, and a number of police officers.
111 These acts, particularly so early 
into the new experiment of the independent Office, were cour ageous acts but 
proper ones that arguably set the right tone for subsequent years, conceiving a 
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prosecution service ‗free from the shackles of the past and from political and 
other influences, including that of the police‘.
112 They demonstrated that the DPP 
would not shy away from initiating prosecutions unpopular with the government 
of the day. 
 
In Western Australia, the DPP operates a small team of five prosecutors within 
the Police Prosecuting Division.
113 Headed by a Consultant State Prosecutor,
114 
the  team  h andles  a  range  of  complex  matters  within  the  Magistrates  Court 
jurisdiction.
115 This is a step towards remedying the situation but while there have 
been a number of attempts to transfer the functions of prosecution from the police 
to the DPP,
116 at time of writing a full-scale transfer has yet to occur. This may 
simply be due to a lack of resources. Michael Rozenes, the then Commonwealth 
Director of Public Prosecution, noted the restrictions on the authority of the DPP 
on the initiation and conduct of prosecuti ons before summary courts, further 
stating that ‗even if a DPP was minded to become involved in prosecutions before 
the summary courts, often the Office simply did not have the funds to do so‘.
117 
As  noted  above,  police  prosecutors  are  not  subject  to  the  same  professional 
obligations as a legal practitioner admitted to the bar. This however, according to, 
John Murray,
118 has its benefits. Police prosecutors often undertake their high 
volume of work in the conduct of a trial with minimal or no preparation.
119 
                                                 
112 Ibid. 
113  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  ( WA),  Annual  Report  2010/2011 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/DPP_Annual_Report_2011.pdf> 12. 
114  Consultant State Prosecutors are the most experienced prosecutors in the Office and are 
allocated the most complex legal matters. They report directly to the Deputy Director of Public 
Prosecutions. See Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions ( WA), Annual Report 2010/2011 
<http://www.dpp.wa.gov.au/content/DPP_Annual_Report_2011.pdf> 10. 
115 Ibid. 
116 In 2006 the Western Australia Police Commissioner announced a desire to move prosec ution 
functions away from the police, ‗WA Commissioner wants to get rid of police prosecutors‘, AAP 
General News Wire (Sydney), 20 Oct 2006, 1; In 2008, Robert Cock, the DPP of WA began 
discussions to take over the role of the police prosecutors, after a successful cost neutral pilot trial 
in the Children‘s Court, Debbie Guest, ‗WA‘s Police Prosecutors could lose role‘, The Australian, 
24 Oct 2008; In 2010, Joe McGrath, upon his appointment as DPP of WA, announced plans to 
take over police prosecutions in the Magistrate‘s Court, Todd Cardy, ‗Lawyers to Replace Police 
Prosecutors‘,  The  Sunday  Times,  3  April  2010.  So  far,  none  of  these  announcements  have 
amounted to a full transfer of prosecutorial functions from the police to the DPP. 
117 Rozenes, above n 39, 2-3. 
118 John Murray was Chief Superintendent and Officer in Charge of the Prosecution Services of 
the South Australian Police Department. 
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Legally qualified practitioners, under their ethical obligations,
120 may not be so 
inclined to do so.
121 Police prosecutors are not subject to such obligations and are 
furthermore working in a quasi-military hierarchy, which allows for the direction 
of police prosecutors to undertake a high workload with little or no preparation.
122 
Murray estimates that a full transfer of prosecutorial functions from the police to 
the DPP would necessitate an increase of staff in the order of 4:1.
123 As such, the 
retention of police prosecutors, though at the risk of prosecutions being criticized 
as not being impartial, is the result of practical necessity. 
 
B The Prosecution System in Singapore 
 
Prosecutions in Singapore come under the control and direction of the Attorney-
General. Singapore does not have the separate statutory Office of a DPP; the role 
of Public Prosecutor is vested in the Attorney-General, as provided for in Article 
35 of Singapore‘s Constitution,
124 and prosecutorial functions and prosecutorial 
discretion  ‗vests  and  vests  exclusively‘  within  that  Office.
125  The  Criminal 
Procedure Code supplements this, stating that ‗the Attorney-General shall be the 
Public  Prosecutor  and  shall  have  the  control  and  direction  of  criminal 
prosecutions and proceedings under this Code or any other written law‘.
126 He is 
assisted in this role by Deputy Public Prosecutors appointed under section 11(3) 
of the Criminal Procedure Code,
127 from legally qualified persons in the Legal 
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Adelaide Police Prosecution Service, and upon  examination of a number of briefs before police 
prosecutors, many opined that they would be reluctant to prosecute because of the limited 
information available. 
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125 Hor, above n 4, 509. 
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Branch of the Singapore  Legal  Service,
128 deployed to the Attorney-General‘s 
Chambers (‗AGC‘). The Public Prosecutor also has ultimate responsibility for the 
conduct  of  prosecutions  handled  by  prosecuting  officials  throughout  various 
government  Ministries  and  Departments.
129  These  prosecutors  need  not 
necessarily be legally qualified, though they are usually supervised by more 
senior officers who would  usually  be  legally  qualified.
130  Where  the matter 
involves a complex question of law or fact, the help of the  AGC is sought.
131 In 
order  to  ensure  consistency  of  prosecution  across  the  various  enforcement 
agencies, the Ministry Prosecutions Directorate was formed in 2011 and allows 
for the AGC to monitor and train lay prosecutors.
132 As is the case in Australia, 
save for a few exceptions,
133 neither the Attorney-General nor his/her Deputies 
are involved in investigations to ensure the separation of functions.
134  Such 
investigations are appropriately left with the various investigative or enforcement 
agencies.
135 
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131 Tseng, above n 59, 104.  
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Corrupt Practices Investigation Burea or any police officer to investigate the accounts of suspects 
in a corruption case, see Tseng, above n 59, 104.   
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1 Independence of the Public Prosecutor 
 
The obvious issue, and one that Australia has arguably resolved with the statutory 
Office  of  the  DPP,  is  the  independence  and  separation  of  the  Singapore‘s 
Attorney-General‘s prosecutorial functions and his/her role as Legal Advisor to 
the Government.
136 A key safeguard to  ensure such independence  is found in 
Article  35  of  Singapore‘s  Constitution,  which  offers  protection  almost  as 
extensive as the Judiciary‘s.
137 The Public Prosecutor can only be removed by a 
tribunal  of  the  Chief  Justice  and  two  Supreme  Court  judges,  with  the  Prime 
Minister‘s recommendation,
138 a process similar to a judge,
139 and then only for 
misbehavior or inability to discharge his functions.
140  
 
The appointment process is also similar to judicial appointments with the Prime 
Minister constitutionally obliged to consult with the Chief Justice, the incumbent 
Attorney-General and the Chairman of the Public Service Commission before 
proposing  a  candidate.
141  The  President  of  Singapore  acts  as  an  additional 
safeguard and may refuse to appoint a candidate p roposed if unconvinced of the 
candidate‘s suitability.
142 Additionally, following appointment the terms of the 
appointment may not be altered disadvantageously.
143 
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138 Ibid; Bala Reddy, ‗The Rule of Law and the Independence of the Public Prosecutor‘, (Paper 
presented at the World Summit of Prosecutors General, Attorneys General and Chief Prosecutors, 
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Romania, 23-25 March, 2009). 
139 The removal of a superior court judge requires five superior court judges  - see Hor, above n 4, 
509-511. 
140 Reddy, above n 138. 
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142 Ibid art 22; Reddy, above n 138. 
143 Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (Singapore) art 35(12)-(13); Hor, above n 4, 509-
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2 Internal Processes and Safeguards 
 
The AGC adopts a system of internal processes where each case handled by a 
Deputy Public Prosecutor is overseen by a panel of three or more senior Deputy 
Public Prosecutors who make a recommendation and then pass  it through the 
Head (or Deputy Head) of the Division, who then in turn add their suggestion and 
passes  it  to  the  Attorney-General  for  the  final  decision.
144  In  this  manner, 
prosecutorial discretion is not left to the whim of a single prosecutor and allows 
for the Attorney-General to receive the benefit of at least two levels of advice 
within the AGC.
145 Similarly, it has been said that internal guidelines have been 
established and are often referred to and  the  factors that might be taken into 
consideration include ‗the interests of the victim, the accused person and society 
as a whole'.
146 Presumably, this can be taken to include a consideration of whether 
a conviction is necessary for the purposes of retribution, denunciation, deterrence 
(specific or general) or the protection of the public.
147 If a conviction is deemed 
unnecessary, then the accused may be let off with a warning,
148 or a composition 
of the offence if appropriate.
149 Ultimately though, there are no publicly available 
guidelines  in Singapore. This leaves much to be desired in terms of public 
scrutiny, accountability and transparency and is in sharp contrast to the Australian 
position where Prosecution Guidelines are readily available to members of the 
public (elaborated on later).
150  
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C The Independence Conundrum 
 
The two system‘s markedly different approaches  brings to light the independence 
conundrum – balancing the need to ensure that the Public Prosecutor is free from 
political  influence  and  the  need  to  ensure  a  degree  of  accountability.  Some 
commentators  have  noted  that  Australia‘s  eagerness  to  de-politicize  the 
prosecution service has its disadvantages, including limited grounds for judicial 
review
151 and near nonexistent parliamentary oversight.
152 Australia thus walks a 
fine line between allowing the DPP sufficient independence but ensuring that 
there is at least some oversight of the Director‘s duties, given that the Office is an 
unelected one, unanswerable to any constituents. This brings up the question of 
independence versus accountability, as evinced by one report: 
 
It  would  defy  the  principles  of  responsible,  democratic  government  if  the 
Attorney-General were to abdicate totally his responsibility for such an important 
area  of  government,  in  favour  of  a  person  who  is  not  elected,  and  thus  not 
answerable to Parliament or the community. However, it is proper, in order to 
facilitate a more efficient and consistent prosecution policy, and to provide for 
what  is  perceived  as  a  more  independent  decision-making  process,  that  the 
Government should give authority to a person to exercise these powers on a day-
to-day basis.
153 
 
The Australian solution it would seem, transfers the prosecutorial functions of the 
Attorney-General to the DPP,
154 but still allows for the retention of the residual 
                                                 
151 Judicial  review  of prosecutorial  discretion  is  limited to rare  cases  where  an  abuse  of 
process can  be  established.  See Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR  501, 513-14. Otherwise, 
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independently of the courts‘,  Price v Ferris (1994) 34 NSWLR 704, 708 (Kirby P).  The  High 
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power of the Attorney-General as the ‗First  Law Officer‘.
155 This additionally 
encompasses several obligations including the furnishing of an annual report to 
the  Attorney-General  with  respect  to  the  operations  of  the  Office.
156  The 
Attorney-General is further required to provide a copy of that report to each 
House of Parliament within fifteen sitting days of receiving the report.
157 The 
system is however, still anxious to keep the Director independent  from the 
Attorney-General. This insistence on a separation of prosecutorial function and 
day to day politics, it would seem, is not just an Australian concern. In the UK 
House of Commons, it was expressed by Sir Harley: 
 
That was the view that Lord Birkenhead once expressed on a famous occasion, 
and Lord Simon stated that the Attorney-General: ‗…should absolutely decline to 
receive orders from the Prime Minister, or Cabinet or anybody else that he shall 
prosecute...‘ I would also add to that that he should also decline to receive orders 
that he should not prosecute: That is the traditional and undoubted position of the 
Attorney-General in such matters…
158 
 
John  McKechnie  notes  that  express  provisions  in  the  Western  Australian  Act 
preclude  the  Attorney-General  from  giving  directions  in  any  particular  case, 
confining  his  power  to  issuing  directions  as  to  general  policy.
159  In Western 
Australia, section 27(2) of the Act makes it clear that the Attorney -General may 
not issue directions in respect of a particular case,
160 with similar provisions in 
several other jurisdictions within Australia.
161  
 
While, the Commonwealth  Director of Public Prosecutions Act allows for the 
Attorney-General  to  give  directions  to  the  DPP  in  general  matters  as  well  as 
                                                 
155  Commonwealth  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions,  above  n  90,  4  [1.2];  Damian  Bugg,  
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individual cases,
162  the direction must first be discu ssed, given in writing and 
subsequently tabled in Parliament and gazetted.
163  The then Director Damian 
Bugg noted that in the twenty-three years since 2007, only four directions have 
been given.
164  None of the directions related to individual matters,
165 and none 
interfered  with  the  independence  of  the  Commonwealth  DPP.
166  This 
demonstrates an adherence to the notion that the Attorney-General, despite having 
final  authority,  should  be  slow  to  interfere  with  the  Director‘s  prosecutorial 
functions. 
 
However, the Office of the DPP also has its own problems. The role of the DPP is 
an appointed one, and while the Office bearer in theory has independence, at least 
for the duration of the appointment, the term of the appointment is not consistent 
throughout Australia. The term of the Office can range from 5 years (Western 
Australia), to a duration to be determined by the Governor/Governor-in-Council 
or the instrument of appointment.
167 In New South Wales, the term of Office was 
initially a lifetime appointment, until Parliam ent amended this.
168  While these 
measures do not apply retrospectively, a failure to amend the pension provisions 
that required the Office holder to retire when they turn 65,
169 attracted criticisms 
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14 June 2007. 
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10-year term‘, The Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 25 September 2007. 28 
 
of the government exerting pressure on then Director Nicholas Cowdery (who 
was appointed for life) in an attempt to encourage him to retire from office.
170 
 
1 The Case of Paul Nemer 
 
The case of Paul Nemer in 2003 highlights the tensions that can arise between an 
independent DPP and the government. In South Australia, Paul Habib Nemer shot 
newsagent  Geoffrey  Williams  resulting  in  the  loss  of  William‘s  eye.  A  plea 
bargain was struck between the prosecution and the defence, where Nemer would 
plead guilty to the lesser charge of endangering life and the Court imposed a 
three-year  good  behavior  bond.
171  There  was  public  dissatisfaction  with  the 
sentence,
172 thought to be inadequate and too lenient given the severity of the 
offence, with allegations that Nemer was treated more favorably because of his 
affluent  background.
173  Subsequent  public  pressure  resulted  in  the Attorney -
General forcing the DPP to appeal the sentence,
174 citing section 9 of the Director 
of  Public Prosecutions  Act, which provided for the Attorney-General  to ‗give 
directions and furnish guidelines to the Director in relation to the carrying out of 
his  or  her  functions‘.
175  The  appeal  was  successful  and  the  initial  sentence 
quashed,  with  a  more  severe  sentence  of  four  years  and  nine  months 
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(News Release, 19 April 2004).  
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174 The Attorney-General‘s direction:  
I  Paul  Holloway,  Attorney-General,  having  consulted  with  the  Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions, pursuant to the Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1991 (SA) s 9(2), direct 
the Director of Public Prosecutions to appeal, pursuant to section 352(1)(a)(iii) of the 
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See  Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (SA),  Annual  Report  2003/2004 
<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/2003-2004.pdf> 17; Robert Moles, A State of Injustice (Lothian, 
2004) Ch 14. 
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imprisonment  imposed,  including  a  non-parole  period  of  one  year  and  nine 
months.
176 
 
The Nemer case brought sharply into focus the difficulty of balancing the need to 
be properly accountable to the community for prosecution decisions made by the 
Office, with the need to ensure that those decisions are free from any political 
influence or even the perception of political influence.
177 While one may argue 
that the actions taken by the Attorney-General was appropriate given his role as 
‗First Law Officer‘, and the government was exercising its power to ‗maintain the 
accountability of the criminal justice system to Parliament‘,
178 it is also arguable 
that the actions run contrary to the principle of independence that is the reason for 
the DPP‘s establishment. 
 
IV THE DISPLACEMENT OF DISCRETION 
 
A Plea Bargaining 
 
While the objective of an independent, fair and accountable prosecution service is 
admirable and commendable, the practicalities of the criminal justice system also 
need  to  be  considered.  It  has  been  estimated  that  for  every  1000  ‗crimes‘ 
committed, only 400 are reported to the police and 320 are officially recorded.
179 
Of these, only 64 will be cleared up, 43 persons convicted and only one will be 
imprisoned.
180 Such is the reality of the criminal law  – of potentially unlimited 
offences being committed, but limited time and resources allocated to address the 
issues. This arguably necessitates a degree of compromise to achieve efficiency 
and by extension, justice.  
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Thus, in the name of efficiency,
181 the nature of our system of prosecutions can 
result in the accused pleading guilty to charges that they were not originally 
charged for.
182 Our criminal jurisprudence has accepted a system which allows an 
accused (in appropriate cases), charged with, say, murder, to agree to plead guilty 
to manslaughter in exchange for a reduced sentence.
183 This can be attributed to 
an amendment and/or withdrawal of charges, often due to the ‗plea bargaining‘ 
process between the accused and the prosecutor.
184 ‗Plea bargaining‘ is a general 
description for the process by which an accused admits his guilt in exchange for 
some  concessions,
185  and it is here that one is able to see the great reach of 
prosecutorial discretion.
186 Current literature is not always consistent in the use of 
the  term  ‗plea  bargaining‘,  ‗plea  discussions‘,  or  ‗charge  bargaining‘.
187  This 
issue is further compounded by slightly different models adopted by varying legal 
systems.
188 To reduce confusion, the term ‗plea bargaining‘ is used in this paper 
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to refer to the process between the accused and the prosecutor where a guilty plea 
is agreed upon in return for a charge for a lesser offence or a dismissal of one or 
more charges.
189 The result is thus a mutually satisfactory disposition of a case, 
subject to the court‘s approval.
190 In this context, the judge plays little or no role 
and is a mere ‗satellite‘ to the discussions, ‗orbiting in a detached manner from 
the main body‘.
191  
 
Plea  bargaining  has  been  accepted  as  a  necessary  component  of  the  criminal 
justice system in Australia and many other jurisdictions.
192 In the United States, 
plea  bargaining  remained  an  underground  practice  until  endorsement  by  the 
courts  in  Santabello  v  New  York,
193  where  it  was  acknowledged  that  plea 
bargaining was an essential com ponent of the administration of justice.
194 The 
absence of plea bargaining would result in an overwhelmed system incapable of 
handling the sheer volume of criminal matters before the courts.
195 In the United 
States, it is now not uncommon for more than 90% of matters to be settled by plea 
bargaining.
196  In  Australia,  while  t he  first  prosecution  policies  contained 
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19 April 1996) 3. 
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193 Santobello v New York, 404 US 257, 260 (1971). For a more comprehensive view of the history 
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prohibitions  against  the  prosecutor  inviting  plea  negotiation  dialogue  with  the 
defence,
197 today, as Damian Bugg notes,
198 a degree of informality is encouraged 
and  prosecutors  are  invited  to  ‗open  the  bidding‘  in  plea  discussions.
199  In 
Western Australia, over 90% of criminal matters are resolved summarily,
200 most 
without trial, usually by a guilty plea. It does not stretch the imagination to see 
that a full trial of all criminal matters would result in a drain on resources and 
overwhelm the system.
201 Singapore has its own system of plea bargaining (as 
will be discussed later),
202 but does not make plea bargaining statistics  publicly 
available – this in and of itself is an example of the efficiency that the Singapore 
system values. By not disclosing plea bargaining figures, no precedent is set. This 
arguably makes the dispensation of justice more efficient, but perhaps at the cost 
of transparency.  
 
1 Advantages of Plea Bargaining 
 
Proponents  of  the  plea  bargaining  system  argue  that  it  offers  benefits  for  all 
stakeholders in the criminal justice system. The prosecutor must allocate finite 
state resources over an ever expanding criminal docket.
203 With plea bargaining, 
prosecutors can summarily dispose of cases that are less serious, allowing them to 
concentrate resources on more serious offences (or offenders) that it would be in 
the public interest to prosecute to the fullest extent possible. The courts also 
benefits by preserving scarce judicial resources for more complicated and serious 
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matters,
204  ensuring  shorter  waiting  times  for  those  serious  cases.  An  early 
negotiated guilty plea also reduces the expense of trial for parties and the court 
(considerable where there is a jury trial). Similarly, an early negotiated plea also 
helps  victims  avoid  the  trauma  of  a  trial  and  the  potential  psychologically 
damaging effects that follow,
205  particularly for victims of sexual offences.
206 
Finally (and perhaps most obviously), there   is also a benefit to the accused. 
Rather than endure a protracted and lengthy trial, with unpredictable outcomes, 
the criminal defendant enters into an agreement with the prosecution and receives 
certain concessions by way of sentencing and a reduction in  the severity and/or 
the overall number of charges.
207 
 
2 Disadvantages of Plea Bargaining 
 
The plea bargaining process raises many philosophical and ethical issues. While 
in principle the judge, despite not being a part of the negotiation between accused 
and the prosecutor, is required to ensure that a plea of guilty by the accused to any 
proposed charges is entered into freely and voluntarily and to impose a sentence 
that properly reflects the criminal conduct of the accused, this is not always the 
case in practice.
208 A plethora of factors may impact on the accused‘s decision to 
plead guilty – the desire to avoid the social stigma that a public trial would bring, 
the desire to resolve the matter speedily, the desire for a more lenient sentence, or 
perhaps even the desire to protect co-offenders.
209 These factors are not always 
apparent to the judge,
210  or  even  if  apparent,  may  still  result  in  the  court‘s 
reluctance to intrude on the exercise of prosecutorial discretion.
211 Additionally, 
while  judges  may  theoreticall y  reject  the  prosecution‘s  recommendation  on 
sentencing,  this  is  seldom  the  case  in  practice  and  more  often  than  not  the 
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recommendations  of  the  prosecutor  are  simply  followed,
212  resulting  in  the 
prosecutor essentially selecting the sentence for the court.
213 This issue is also 
compounded  with  the  advent  of  mandatory  penalties  (as  will  be  discussed 
later).
214  
 
(a) Fair Labeling and Bargaining 
 
It is an underlying thread of the criminal law that the  degrees of wrongdoing 
should  be  subdivided  and  labeled  so  as  to  represent  fairly  the  nature  and 
magnitude of the law-breaking.
215 This is the principle of ‗fair labeling‘
216 and is 
the voice through which the ‗criminal law speaks to society as well as wrongdoers 
when  it  convicts  them…by  accurately  naming  the  crime  of  which  they  are 
convicted‘.
217 With plea bargaining, the offence which the offender pleads guilty 
to  may  not  necessarily  be the one which accurately  reflects  the nature of the 
criminal conduct.
218 Critics assert that it is criminals who benefit from the system 
by effectively ‗bargaining with the state‘ and avoiding what would have been an 
appropriate sanction for their crime.
219  Is it fair that a murderer may only be 
convicted of wounding or that the actions of thieves are labeled as mere attempts 
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or  possession?
220  Aside  from  throwing  crime  statistics  into  chaos  it  risks 
undermining public confidence in the criminal justice system.
221  
 
This issue is evident in several extreme, but illustrative cases. In New York for 
example, an accused was charged with first degree manslaughter but later pleaded 
guilty to attempted manslaughter in the second degree.
222 The oddity was that in 
that particular jurisdiction, the crime of manslaughter does not involve intent and 
it would therefore be impossible to attempt to commit manslaughter. T he New 
York Court of Appeals, while aware of the issue, was nonetheless not prepared to 
upset the conviction.
223 In another more comical case, an accused pleaded guilty 
to ‗driving the wrong way on a one-way street‘.
224 There were however, no one-
way streets in that particular community. These cases, while absurd, do highlight 
the dangers inherent in uncontrolled prosecutorial discretion.
225 
 
(b) The Dissatisfied Victim 
 
The role of the victim sometimes takes  a backseat  in  our criminal  process.
226 
McDonald notes that ‗while the victim is allowed to decide what shall be done 
with the case as a civil matter…the criminal case belongs solely to the State.‘
227 
This is derived from the notion that crime is perceived as an offence against not 
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just the individual, but society,
228 and is accordingly a matter for the State. As 
argued above,
229 there are circumstances where it may be in the interests of the 
victim to avoid trial. Conversely, there are situations where the victim may prefer 
to go to court and testify if the alternative is the accused receiving a lesser charge 
(and consequently, a lesser sentence).
230 
 
Plea bargaining deprives the victim of this option. While a victim‘s view may be 
considered,  this  varies  with  the  individual  prosecutor.
231  Ultimately,  if  the 
decision is made to enter into a plea bargaining arrangement with the accused, 
there may be a feeling of dissatisfaction by the victim that the offender has 
‗gotten away‘ with a lenient sentence.
232 While the advantages of plea bargaining 
focus on the resource implications for the system as a whole, the individual victim 
is only focused on their particular case. Plea bargaining potentially leaves victims 
dissatisfied  with  the  criminal  justice  system  leading  to  diminished  public 
confidence in the process.
233 
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3 The Prosecutor-Adjudicator: The Prosecutor’s Power in the Pre-Trial Decision 
Making Process 
 
The  great  reach  of  prosecutorial  discretion  is  prominently  seen  in  the  plea 
bargaining process.
234 Prosecutors are given great leeway in plea bargaining
235 as 
they  and they  alone   determine which  charges  to lay  against the accused,
236 
whether they will make or accept a plea bargain offer or even if all charges should 
be dismissed.
237 An accused‘s acceptance of a lesser plea does not require the 
approval of the court.
238 This has resulted in the  prosecution‘s role being one of 
the most important in the pre-trial decision-making process.
239 The court has little 
or no opportunity to intervene in the pre-trial decision making process.
240 Its task 
is limited to passing sentence after the charge bargaining arrangements have been 
concluded and the accused has pleaded guilty to the respective charges.
241  
 
Plea bargaining puts the prosecutor center stage in criminal administration and 
forms a vital component of the massive and powerful reservoir of prosecutorial 
discretion.
242 Arguably, plea bargaining system places too much power into the 
hands  of  the  prosecution.
243  Commentators  have  referred  to  this  enormous 
discretion, done without judicial over sight, as ‗prosecutorial adjudication‘.
244 It 
has been contended that  
 
with trials in open court and deserved sentences imposed by a neutral fact finder, 
we  protect the due  process  right  to  an adversarial  trial,  minimize  the risk  of 
unjust conviction of the innocent, and at the same time further the public interest 
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in  effective  law  enforcement  and  adequate  punishment  of  the  guilty…plea 
negotiations simultaneously undercuts all of these interests.
 245 
 
This has lead to some to call for its abolition.
246 Indeed, the wide range of powers 
the prosecutor has in the conduct of prosecutions provides a degree of leverage. 
Critics have noted that in some circumstances,
247 the daunting penalties that a 
defendant faces if convicted in court can result in the innocent defendant pleading 
guilty.
248  Risk adverse defendants (even if innocent),
249  when faced with the 
choice of pleading guilty weighed against the harsh penalties if convicted at trial, 
may  well choose to plead  guilty.
250  The forum  for the determination of an 
individual‘s liberty thus shifts from open court to the offices of the prosecutor, 
giving him power of both judge and prosecutor.
251 
 
As highlighted, one can begin to comprehend the immense scope and reach that 
the prosecutorial discretion affords. This is however, not t he end of the story. It 
has it seems become somewhat fashionable for legislatures throughout the world 
to concentrate discretion that should, in an ideal system , be properly vested in 
other branches of government, into the executive office of the prosecutor. Broadly 
defined offences, overlapping provisions in the criminal codes and a fondness for 
mandatory sentencing have worked to expand the authority of the prosecutor.
252  
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B Overcriminalization and Broadly Defined Statutes 
 
Legislators  enact  broad  criminal  statutes  capable  of  nondiscriminatory 
application.
253 It then falls to the police and prosecution to identify and select a 
manageable number of cases to prosecu te.
254  Given that criminal conduct is 
described  in  general  terms,  ‗sweep[ing]  together  similar  acts  by  markedly 
different actors amid infinitely variable circumstances, the exercise of discretion 
allows  for  the  law  to  exempt  those  for  whom  criminal  prosecution  is  neither 
appropriate nor necessary‘.
255 This discretion is also seen as necessary as public 
attitudes  change  over  time  and  it  is  not  always  immediately  possible  for  the 
legislature  to  make  the  necessary  amendments.  To  some  extent,  prosecutorial 
discretion also functions as an informal means of ‗testing‘ public reaction which 
may lead to subsequent legislative amendments on the issue.
256 
 
The problem arises when legislators become overzealous in promulgating more 
criminal laws than the Executive has resources to enforce.
257 Indeed, if one takes 
into account the politics of the criminal law, legislators, as elected representatives 
of the people, are often tempted by the conventional wisdom that appearing tough 
on crime is one way of garnering popularity amongst  the electorate.
258 This has 
subsequently resulted in a myriad of new offences and enhanced penalties as 
‗publicity stunts‘ designed to win support and elections.
259  
 
Commentators  have  noted  that  statutory  criminal  codes  contain  so  many 
overlapping provisions that the choice of how to characterize conduct as criminal 
has passed to the prosecutor.
260 One of the dangers of these overly broad statutes 
is that they can be utilized by the prosecution for ‗posturing‘ during the plea 
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bargaining  process.
261  Indeed,  as  Dervan  argues,  there  is  a  ‗symbiotic 
relationship‘ between overcriminalisation and plea bargaining – both he contends, 
rely  on  each  other  for  their  very  existence  in  the  criminal  justice  system.
262 
Expanding statutory offences only provides more ‗items on a menu from which 
the prosecutor may order as she [sic] wishes‘.
263  
 
One controversial example of overly broad legislation that indirectly results in 
heightened prosecutorial discretion may be found in Singapore‘s Misuse of Drugs 
Act.
264  The  Act  imposes  severe  pun ishment  on  drug  trafficking,
265  which is 
defined  in  the  Act  as  ‗to  give,  sell,  administer,  transport,  send,  deliver  or 
distribute‘.
266  The  Singapore  courts  have  interpreted  this  literally  and  merely 
passing possession on to someone else can amount to trafficking, regardless of the 
offender‘s  intent  for  personal  use  or  safekeeping.
267  There  are  however  some 
possible exceptions. For example, a traditional Chinese physician was held not to 
be trafficking when he secretly administered opium as a remedy for pain relief of 
joints.
268 The effect of broadly defined ‗drift net‘ statutes is that it is up to the 
police and prosecution to determine who the ‗real traffickers‘ are.
269  
 
Similarly, in Western Australia, the Criminal Property Confiscation Act gives the 
State a wide scope to seize property that is the proceeds of crime or property that 
has been unlawfully obtained.
270 The Act is also notable for its reversal of the 
onus of proof,
271  requiring suspects to prove that their wealth was lawfully 
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obtained and its unlimited retrospectivity.
272 The Attorney-General, Jim McGinty 
acknowledged when introducing the Act that it ‗is being cast far broader than ever 
could  be intended to apply‘.
273  Its  breadth  ‗means the role of the Director of 
Public Prosecutions as its controller is crucially important. [It requires] a DPP 
who will not use the power capriciously and will take into account the public 
interest‘.
274 
 
A related problem is when laws on statute books are not regularly enforced. This 
undermines the legal system and the rule of law. In Singapore, section 377A of 
the  Penal  Code  criminalizes  sexual  conduct  between  males.
275  While  the 
Government has stated that  this will not be actively enforced,
276 it nonetheless 
remains on the statute books and could theoretically be utilized by prosecutors for 
‗posturing‘ - by putting forward a section 377A charge, then offering to accept a 
guilty plea to a lesser offence. An example of this was seen in the recent Tan Eng 
Hong case.
277 This puts the offender in an unenviable situation and most may well 
plead guilty to the lesser offence if only to avoid the stigma of a section 377A 
charge. Overly broad legislation and laws that are on the books but not regularly 
enforced effectively shift discretion from the courts to the prosecutors. 
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Prosecutors  can  also  ‗negate‘  possible  defences  raised  by  the  accused  in  the 
framing of charges. For example, facts that give rise to an assault occasioning 
bodily  harm  under  the  Criminal  Code
278  can  also  fall  under  the  category  of 
wounding or grievous bodily harm.
279 In the former, the defence of provocation is 
open to the accused, whereas the latter offences make no such provisions. Again, 
the prosecutor  is able to select from the menu of charges available which to 
proceed on. In the careful selection of charges, prosecutors can thus effectively 
anticipate and bypass defences that may be raised.  
 
As argued, through overcriminalisation and broadly defined statutes, Legislatures 
have effectively abdicated public policy -making to the prosecutor.
280 This has 
attracted  criticism  that  prosecutors  are  ‗the  criminal  justice  system‘s  real 
lawmakers‘.
281 
 
C The Imposition of Mandatory Minimum Sentences 
 
Mandatory minimum sentences also shifts discretion from the courts and place it 
into  the  prosecutor‘s  hands.  Mandatory  minimum  sentencing
282  refers to the 
practice of parliament setting a fixed penalty for the commission of a criminal 
offence.
283 This effectively leaves the court with only one (or rather no) option 
upon sentencing.
284 With mandatory minimum sentencing, the choice of charge 
laid has a profound and direct impact on sentence. The same reasons that give rise 
to overcriminsalisation can also be found  in mandatory minimum sentencing  – 
politicians are eager to be seen as tough on crime.
285 Mandatory sentencing dates 
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as  far  back  as  1790  in  the  United  States,
286  and  in  the  eighteenth and early 
nineteenth century  in  England.
287  The 1990s witnessed a number of varying 
jurisdictions across the common law world increasing the number of mandatory 
sentencing  laws.
288  Canada  began  passing  a  record  number  of  mandatory 
sentencing  laws  from  1982
289  and  by  1999,  the  Criminal  Code  of  Canada 
contained 29 offences carrying mandatory sentencing.
290 The United States has 
enacted a myriad of mandatory sentencing laws relating to aggravated rape, drug 
felonies,  felonies  involving  firearms  and  felonies  committed  by  previously 
convicted felons.
291 Singapore is no stranger to mandatory minimum sentencing 
having inherited fixed sentencing from the  Indian  Penal  Code.
292  Mandatory 
sentencing was later expanded for crimes under a number of statutes
293 and the 
Penal  Code  (Amendment) Act  1984 provided for the imposition of mandatory 
minimum sentences for a range of offences including robbery, housebreaking, 
vehicle  theft,  extortion,  aggravated  outrage  of  modesty,  and  rape  (if  certain 
circumstances are made out).
294 
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Justice  in  Singapore  (2001) 41,  to  be  read  in  conjunction  with  Jill  Tan,  ‗Book  Review:  The 
Development of Criminal Law and Criminal Justice in Singapore‘ [2001] Singapore Journal of 
Legal Studies 229, 230 as the latter corrects a number of inaccuracies in the original article. See 
Palakrishnan, above n 290. The respective offences are contained in the Penal Code (Singapore, 
cap 224, rev ed 2008) include robbery: s392; housebreaking: ss456, 457; vehicle theft: s379A; 
extortion:  s383;  aggravated  outrage  of  modesty:  s354A;  rape:  s376(2).  See  also  Singapore, 44 
 
 
In  1996  Western  Australia
295  adopted  mandatory  minimum  se ntencing  for 
property  offences  in  response  to  a  ‗moral  panic‘  due  to  a  number  of  home 
invasions  and  the  perceived  inadequateness  of  sentences.  This  resulted  in  the 
‗three-strike rule‘ which provided that an offender convicted for the third time for 
a home burglary must receive a 12 month term of imprisonment.
296 More recently, 
likely due to the incident of police officer Matthew Butcher being assaulted and 
paralysed,  Parliament  has  passed  mandatory  sentencing  laws  for  persons 
convicted of assaulting police officers.
297 It would seem then that the Legislature 
in Western Australia and in various other jurisdictions have taken to including 
mandatory  minimum  penalties  in  their  criminal  statutes  in  what  may  be  a 
popularist approach.
298 
 
The issue with mandatory minimum sentencing is that it ‗chips away‘
299 at the 
judge‘s  role  as  adjudicator  and  curtails  judicial  discretion  in  sentencing, 
transferring  it  to  the  prosecution.
300  Critics  argue  that  the  legislature‘s 
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demonstrated eagerness to implement mandatory sentencing regimes is a knee-
jerk reaction perceived to be popular with the electorate. Given this, the argument 
is that this is the beginning of a slippery slope that will eventually see a plethora 
of offences on the statute books with mandatory minimum penalties that may, in 
the  most  extreme  scenario,  see  judicial  discretion  reduced  and  prosecutorial 
discretion reaching unprecedented levels. 
 
1 The Mandatory Death Penalty 
 
Singapore has unapologetically imposed mandatory penalties as a response to a 
perceived  breakdown  in  social  order.
301  Controversially, it has also achieved 
notoriety for the ultimate mandatory penalty  – the mandatory death penalty.
302 
Singapore prescribes the mandatory death penalty for a number of offences, 
including homicide and drug offences.
303 The mandatory death penalty is quite 
different from the death penalty. In the latter, the death penalty may be imposed 
as a sentence, subject to the discretion of the court. In the former, the court‘s role 
is minimized so that upon the pronunciation of guilt (or acceptance of a guilty 
plea  by  the  accused),  the  law  expressly  demands  the  imposition  of  the  death 
penalty. In such situations, the hands of the court are tied in matters of sentencing. 
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writing, a number of changes to the mandatory death penalty for homicide and drug offences are 
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It is arguable that to some extent, the power over life and death slides out of the 
judiciary, into the hands of the prosecution.  
 
This curtailing of the judiciary‘s discretion may be due to a number of reasons. It 
may be to allow for greater consistency in sentencing, or it may be part of a larger 
political  trend  toward  distrust  of  the  courts  and  greater  empowerment  of  the 
prosecutor.
304 For some, this shift in power has caused concern, while others have 
accepted it as a necessary state of affairs. Nevertheless, this shift  illustrates the 
‗hydraulic  displacement  effect‘.
305  The  displacement  theory  proposes  that 
discretion is inevitable,
306 and in this case the discretion taken away from the 
courts merely appears elsewhere – in the prosecutor‘s office. 
 
As argued above, plea bargaining, overcriminalisation, broadly defined statutes 
and mandatory minimum sentences have given prosecutors greater leeway in the 
administration of justice. These measures have not however, come without their 
own  costs.  The  expanded  discretion  afforded  to  prosecutors  have  arguably 
resulted in lessened transparency and accountability. 
 
V RESTRAINTS ON THE PROSECUTOR 
 
A Duty to Give Reasons 
 
The body responsible for the definition of a crime, the Legislature, is subject to 
the democratic process and is accountable to the electorate. Parliamentary debates 
are  publicized  and  freely  available.  Similarly,  the  Judiciary,  responsible  for 
pronouncing  guilt  or  innocence,  also  has  certain  standards  to  hold  them 
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accountable.  Save for a few exceptions,
307 court hearings are open to the public. 
Most mature and competent judicial systems have adopted the principle heralded 
by Lord Denning more than half a century ago that in order for a trial to be fair, it 
is necessary not only that a correct decision should be reached, but also that it 
should be seen to be based on reason; an d that can only be seen if the decision 
maker states his reasons.
308 This facilitates public accountability, public scrutiny, 
and  public  confidence  in  the system.
309  Additionally,  in  Coleman  v  Dunlop 
Limited,
310 Henry LJ, in quoting Lord Donaldson MR, stated tha t ‗[h]aving to 
give reasons concentrates the mind wonderfully‘.
311 Singaporean courts have also 
taken this view in Thong Ah Fat,
312 stating that the duty to provide reasons leads 
to greater care in analyzing the evidence and gives rise to sounder decisions,
313 or 
at the very least, providing the basis for it.
314 This process, it is contended, as well 
as  ‗acting  prophylactically‘
315  on  the  mind,  ‗guards  against  unconsidered  or 
impulsive decisions.
316  
 
The position in Australia on the duty to give reasons has been even  clearer.
317 
Australian courts have moved beyond the duty to state the reasons for decisions 
and onto the extent of that obligation as was the case in  Waterson v Batten.
318 
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This  principle  has  also  been  reiterated  in  Soulemezis  v  Dudley
319  and  Public 
Service  Board  of  New  South  Wales  v  Osmond.
320  The idea is, as was put by  
Rawls, is that reasons for decisions that are debated, attacked and defended 
amount to an important restraint on the decision maker‘s exercise of power.
321 It 
is therefore accepted that public accountability of the branches of government that 
play a role in the criminal law process is a crucial and integral part of any legal 
system that aspires to administer justice.
322 
 
It is somewhat of an oddity then that the prosecutor has far fewer limitations and 
is subject to far less scrutiny.
323 In Australia, while publicly available policies 
guide the conduct of prosecutors in the exercise of their discretion, prosecutors, in 
general, are not required to explain their d ecisions and typically do not.
324 The 
rationale for a decision, to prosecute a particular case or not is rarely available and 
few mechanisms of review  are  available to the public.
325  This is somewhat 
questionable as prosecutors, though performing a very different role from judges, 
do make decisions on prosecutorial matters, and  is arguably  playing a ‗quasi-
judicial‘ role.
326 In light of this, it is arguable that there would be some benefit in 
requiring the prosecutors to give reasons for decisions. It would, in the words of 
Lord  Donaldson,  ‗concentrate  the  mind  wonderfully‘,
327  and  lead  to  increased 
care in analyzing the evidence and coming to a decision on whether to prosecute 
or not, which charges to lay and other prosecutorial functions. Of course, and as 
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will be discussed further in this paper,
328 there are costs associated with having to 
provide reasons. 
 
B Discovery Obligations 
 
In the pursuit of truth in criminal proceedings, parties are obliged to comply with 
the ‗rules of the game‘.
329  
 
[S]ince it is impossible to equip both the prosecution and the defence with the 
same investigative facilities the only reasonable way to attain advance equality in 
access  to  the  evidence  is  through  the  ‗system‘,  that  is  through  a  discovery 
procedure.
330 
 
In the criminal justice system, the vast resources of the State are pitted against the 
individual defendant. Imposing disclosure obligations on the prosecution allows 
for the accused to have access to the evidence relevant to his/her case.
331 This 
ensures that the accused is aware of  the case to be met and is able to adequately 
prepare their defence.
332 Also, and on a more practical note, discovery assists in 
resolving  non-contentious  and  time -consuming  issues  ahead  of  trial  and  to 
encourage the entering of guilty pleas at an early stage.
333 
 
In the United Kingdom, there was a series of highly publicized, controversial 
cases  in  the late  1980s  and  early  1990s   that  highlighted  the importance  of 
disclosure obligations in the conduct of a fair trial .  ‗Kiszko‘,
334  the  ‗Maguire 
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Seven‘,
335 the ‗Taylor sisters‘,
336 the ‗Birmingham Six‘,
337 the ‗Guildford Four‘
338 
and ‗Judith Ward‘
339 all involved non-disclosure of significant material by the 
prosecution which resulted in a miscarriage of justice. In response,
340  the English 
courts saw an expansion of the prosecu tion‘s  disclosure  obligations  from  R  v 
Saunders,
341 R v Maguire
342 and culminating in R v Ward where it was held that 
any material gathered by the prosecution was capable of disclosure.
343 
 
In Australia, ‗miscarriages of justice due to non-disclosure have not occurred with 
same degree of frequency nor sensationalism [so] as to cause an appellate court to 
act so decisively‘.
344 That has however, changed with R v Mallard.
345 In Mallard, 
it  was  conceded  by  the  prosecution  on    appeal  to  the  High  Court  that  the 
nondisclosure  of  certain  materials  had  breached  the  DPP‘s  Statement  of 
Prosecution Policy and Guidelines that had been made and gazetted pursuant to 
the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  Act  1991  (WA).
346  Kirby J adopted the 
following statement as representing an accu rate position of the common law in 
Australia:  
 
The prosecution is not obliged to lead evidence which may undermine the Crown 
case, but fairness requires that material in its possession which may undermine 
the Crown case is disclosed to the defence. The prosecution is not obliged to lead 
the evidence of witnesses who are likely in its opinion to be regarded by the 
judge or jury as incredible or unreliable. Yet fairness requires that material in its 
                                                                                                                                     
Legal  Blunders  (Robinson,  2000)  249-254;  Jonathan  Rose  and  Steve  Panter,  Innocents:  How 
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possession  which  may  cast  doubt  on  the  credibility  or  reliability  of  those 
witnesses whom it chooses to lead must be disclosed
347 
 
The  High  Court  confirmed  the  formal  and  wide  duty  of  disclosure  that  the 
prosecution should comply with and that the Statement of Prosecution Policy and 
Guidelines served to complement the common law duty in this regard.
348 The 
prosecution‘s failure to meet its disclosure obligation may lead to an order that the 
conviction be quashed, as was the case in Mallard.
349 Additionally, in Western 
Australia, following a number of recommendations (alb eit many years later),
350 
Parliament has since introduced statutory provisions that have strengthened the 
disclosure obligations.
351 These disclosure obligations are also reflected in the 
DPP‘s own Statement of Policy and Guidelines.
352 
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352 See Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (WA), Statement of Prosecution Policy and 
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<http://www.dpp.sa.gov.au/03/prosecution_policy_guidelines.pdf>;  
Office  of  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  (Vic),  Prosecutorial  Guidelines  (1993) 
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 [8.1]-[8.18];  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (NSW), Office of Director of Public Prosecutions 
Guidelines (2007)  
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C Judicial Review 
 
Australia and Singapore have both evinced a general reluctance to interfere with 
functions of prosecutorial discretion. Australian courts do not purport to exercise 
control over the commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings, save 
where it is necessary to prevent an abuse of process or to ensure a fair trial.
353 In a 
number of cases, the courts have confirmed the position that the decision whether 
or not to prosecute a case is not susceptible to judicial review.
354 This stems from 
R v Maxwell where the High Court held that certain decisions involved in the 
prosecution process are, of their nature, insusceptible of judicial review.
355 They 
include decisions whether or not to prosecute,
356 to enter a nolle prosequi,
357 to 
proceed ex officio,
358 whether or not to present evidence
359 and decisions as to the 
particular charge to be laid or prosecuted.
360 As observed in Maxwell: 
 
The  integrity  of  the  judicial  process  —  particularly,  its  independence  and 
impartiality and the public perception thereof — would be compromised if the 
courts were to decide or were to be in any way concerned with decisions as to 
who is to be prosecuted and for what.
361  
 
                                                                                                                                     
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (ACT), Prosecution Policy and Guidelines of the 
Director of Public Prosecutions (1991)  
<http://www.dpp.act.gov.au/about_the_dpp/the_prosecution_policy>;  
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (Tas), Director of Public Prosecution Guidelines 
(1994) <http://www.crownlaw.tas.gov.au/dpp/prosecution_guidelines>;  
<http://www.odpp.nsw.gov.au/guidelines/DPP%20Guidelines_whole_document_current%20to%2
031_dec_2010.pdf>. 
353 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 90-1, 96. 
354 Ibid 94; R v Jewitt [1985] 2 SCR 128 , 139–140. 
Hanna v Director of Public Prosecutions [2005] NSWSC 134 [40]. It is also difficult to get a 
mandamus against any body  with prosecutorial or quasi-prosecutorial functions or powers  to 
force it to take action, see Hannes Schoombee and Lee McIntosh, ‗Watching over the Watch-
Dogs: Regulatory Theory and Practice, with Particular Reference to Environmental Regulation‘ 
(Paper presented at the Australian Institute of Administrative Laws Annual Conference, 4-5 July 
2002).  
355 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501. 
356  Connelly  v  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions [1964]  AC  1254,  1277; Director  of  Public 
Prosecutions v Humphrys [1977] AC 1, 46; Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 94-5, 110. 
357  R v Allen (1862) ER 929; Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 90-1. 
358 Barton v The Queen (1980) 147 CLR 75, 92-3, 104, 107, 109. 
359 R v Apostilides (1984) 154 CLR 563, 575. 
360 R v McCready (1985) 20 A Crim R 32, 39; Chow v Director of Public Prosecutions (1992) 28 
NSWLR 593, 604-5 cited in Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501 (emphasis added). 
361 Maxwell v The Queen (1996) 184 CLR 501, 534. 53 
 
Similarly, the selection of the appropriate charges to proceed with is a matter with 
which the court will not usually interfere with.
362 This position may even extend 
(as is notoriously common in drug offences) to decisions to particularize in the 
charge the amount of a prohibited drug as this is a matter for prosecutorial 
discretion. In Matthews v Greene, the Court held that ‗it may be that, as with the 
choice of a charge, the exercise of this prosecutorial discretion will be a matter 
with which courts are reluctant to intervene‘.
363  
 
The court can, however, in limited circumstances where the bringing of criminal 
proceedings are themselves oppressive and an abuse of process, embark upon a 
preliminary enquiry and stay proceedings.
364 It should however be emphasized 
that this power stems from the court‘s inherent jurisdiction to protect its own 
processes from abuse and is not an opportunity for the judge to stray beyond a 
judicial role.
365 In the words of McKechnie J: 
 
A Judge is not a Director of Public Prosecutions. It is not enough for a Judge to 
conclude  that  were  he  or  she  to  exercise  the  prosecutorial  discretion,  in 
accordance with published prosecutorial guidelines, an indictment would not be 
presented or would be discontinued. A Judge can only exercise the power if 
satisfied that the processes of the Court, having been invoked, cannot continue in 
the interests of justice… In deciding the interests of justice require a stay of an 
indictment a judge should be careful not to stray beyond a proper judicial role. 
The institution and continuation of judicial proceedings is a wholly executive 
function.
366 
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The  respective  Director  of  Public  Prosecutions  Acts  authorize  the  function  of 
prosecutions to be carried out by the Director.
367 The institution and continuation 
of criminal proceedings is thus a wholly executive function. As is made clear in 
Maxwell and the aforementioned cases, decisions made by the prosecution are 
seldom subject to judicial review.
368 
 
A number of challenges to the Attorney -General‘s prosecutorial discretion have 
also  come  before  the  courts  in  Singapore.  The  current  position  is  that  the 
Attorney-General  is  vested  with  prosecutorial  discretion,  entrusted  with  this 
function as the Public Prosecutor by virtue of the Constitution. The courts have 
evinced a general reluctance to interfere with this, as seen in cases such as Ong 
Chin  Keat  Jeffrey
369,  Sim  Min  Teck,
370  Thiruselvam
371  and  Ramalingam 
Ravinthran,
372 which are discussed below. 
 
1 Prosecutorial Malpractice and Abuse 
 
In Ong Chin Keat Jeffrey,
373 the Court had to consider the power to stay criminal 
proceedings  as  a  check  against  alleged  Executive  malpractice.  The  Court 
considered the English cases of R v Horseferry Road Magistrate’s Court 
374and R 
v Latif 
375 and acknowledged the need ‗to balance the need to try those accused of 
serious crimes with a competing public interest to ensure that the courts did not 
endorse malpractice by the Executive‘.
376 The judge however, went on to note 
that  these  were  a  distinctly  English  approach  influenced  by  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights,
377 and ‗these developments within Europe are not 
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replicated  in  Singapore‘.
378  Accordingly  then,  the  Singapore  position  can  be 
distinguished from these cases in favour of ‗local conditions‘ that preserve the 
‗fundamental  values  of  Singapore  society‘.
379  This  decision  affirms  the  broad 
discretion  vested  in  the  Public  Prosecutor  in  Singapore  and  perhaps  more 
significantly, its distinctly local flavour.
380 
 
2 Prosecutorial Discretion and Equality  
 
(a) Sim Min Teck v Public Prosecutor 
 
In Sim Min Teck,
381 the appellant was charged with murder, while his accomplice 
faced the lesser offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder. The 
appellant  argued  that  this  was  in  breach  of  Article  12(1)  of  Singapore‘s 
Constitution which provides for equality before the law and equal protection of 
the law. The issue in contention was that unlawful possession of firearms and 
ammunition was not a capital offence under the Arms Act
382 but was under the 
Internal  Security  Act.
383  The  prosecution could thus select  charges from two 
distinct provisions, each with varying penalties. The Attorney -General chose to 
proceed with a charge under the Internal Security Act, and this was challenged on 
grounds of a breach of Article 8 of the Constitution of Malaysia, the Malaysian 
equivalent of Singapore‘s Article 12,
384 which provides for equality and equal 
protection under the law.  The Court quoted Lord Diplock‘s statement in Teh 
Cheng Poh, stating that: 
 
[t]here are many factors which a prosecuting authority may properly take into 
account in exercising its discretion as to whether to charge a person at all, or, 
where the information available to it discloses the ingredients of a greater as well 
as a lesser offence, as to whether to charge the accused with the greater or the 
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lesser. The existence of those factors to which the prosecuting authority may 
properly have regard and the relative weight to be attached to each of them may 
vary enormously between one case and another. All that equality before the law 
requires, is that the cases of all potential defendants to criminal charges shall be 
given unbiased  consideration by the prosecuting authority and that decisions 
whether or not to prosecute in a particular case for a particular offence should not 
be dictated by some irrelevant consideration.
385 
 
The Court thus reaffirmed the doctrine that so long as irrelevant considerations do 
not  influence  prosecution  decisions,  the  Public  Prosecutor  is  empowered  to 
‗institute, conduct or discontinue any proceedings for any offence‘,
386 and in the 
exercise of that discretion, may consider a myriad of factors. The Court did not go 
on  to  indicate  any  factors  that  should  be  considered  by  the  prosecution  and 
perhaps in doing so, deliberately left such matters for the prosecution to decide 
on. Arguably, this evinces a judicial reluctance to interfere with the prosecutor‘s 
role in the conduct of criminal proceedings. 
 
(b) Thiruselvam s/o Nagaratnam v Public Prosecutor 
 
In  Thiruselvam  s/o  Nagaratnam,
387  the  appellant  faced  a  capital  charge  of 
abetment for trafficking 807.6 grams of cannabis, where the principal offender 
was charged (and pleaded guilty) in a separate trial on two non-capital charges for 
supplying cannabis.
388Again, the argument raised by th e appellant was that this 
differentiation of charges for essentially the same set of facts constituted a breach 
of Article 12(1) of Singapore‘s Constitution.
389 The Court of Appeal held that 
there was no such breach and dismissed the appeal accordingly. In its decision, 
the Court again cited the Privy Council‘s reasoning in Teh Cheng Poh.
390  
 
In Thiruselvam, Thean JA considered Sim Min Teck and concluded that: 
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'[t]he  principle  remains  the  same.  The  prosecution  has  a  wide  discretion  to 
determine  what  charge  or  charges  should  be  preferred  against  any  particular 
offender, and to proceed on charges of different severity as between different 
participants of the same criminal acts'.
391  
 
Again the Court affirmed in no uncertain terms that it is for the Attorney-General, 
as Public Prosecutor, to make the determination on what charge or charges to 
proceed with. Indeed, the Courts‘ unflinching stance in this area has resulted in 
academics noting that that future appeals ‗…may be doomed to an even more 
spectacular rejection as the last resort of an appellant‘.
392 
 
(c) Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General 
 
In  Ramalingam  Ravinthran,
393  two men were arrested for trafficking 5560.1 
grams  of  cannabis  and  2078.3  grams  of  cannabis  mixture.  Ramalingam‘s 
accomplice,  Sundar  was  charged  with  trafficking  499.99  grams  of  cannabis, 
999.99 grams of tetrahydrocannabinol and cannabinol and was jailed for 20 years 
and given 24 strokes of the cane, narrowly escaping the mandatory death penalty 
threshold amount.
394 Ramalingam was charged with the full 5560.1 grams and 
faced the mandatory death penalty.
395 Ramalingam filed a motion to question if 
the Attorney-General had deprived him of his right to fair treatment and sought to 
have his charges amended. 
 
Counsel  for  the  appellant  argued  that  it  was  ‗patently  irrational‘
396  for  the 
prosecution to have charged Sundar with trafficking a lesser amount of drugs than 
the  amount  which  he  had  actually  delivered  to  the  Applicant  because  this 
‗defie[d] the physical laws of nature‘.
397 In so doing, the prosecution ‗ignored 
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reality, or rather, created its own reality‘,
398 in order to reduce the gravity of the 
charges against Sundar and, correspondingly, the severity of the punishment he 
would face. Such a decision, it was argued, could not be within the legitimate 
discretion of the Attorney-General. One of the questions raised was whether it is 
within the Attorney-General‘s prosecutorial discretion to ‗salami slice‘ threshold 
amounts for the purposes of laying charges.
399   
 
The Court held that the prosecutorial power is a constitutional power vested in the 
Attorney-General  pursuant  to  Article  35(8)  of  the  Constitution.  It  is 
constitutionally  equal  in  status  to  the  judicial  power  set  out  in  Article  93. 
Referring to Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis,
400 the Court in 
Ramalingam stated that: 
 
… These two provisions expressly separate the prosecutorial function from the 
judicial function, and give equal status to both functions. Hence, both organs 
have an equal status under the Constitution, and neither may interfere with each 
other‘s  functions  or  intrude  into the  powers  of the other,  subject  only  to  the 
constitutional power of the court to prevent the prosecutorial power from being 
exercised  unconstitutionally.  Indeed,  this  is  not  even  a  true  ‗interference‘ 
inasmuch as the exercise of a function unconstitutionally is, in effect, not an 
exercise of that function at all and which it is therefore the duty of the court 
(pursuant to the Constitution itself) to prevent.
401 
 
Citing a number of United States‘ cases,
402 the Court held that in view of the high 
Office of the Attorney-General, courts should proceed on the basis that when the 
Attorney-General  initiates  a  prosecution  against  an  offender  (regardless  of 
                                                 
398 Ibid [50]. 
399 As opined by V J Rajah JA in Teo Xuanwei, ‗Two men caught with drugs but they faced 
different amounts: Lawyer challenges AGC‘s decision to charge one  with bringing in smaller 
amount of drugs‘, Today (Singapore), 10 November 2011, 34. 
400 Law Society of Singapore v Tan Guat Neo Phyllis (2008) SLR(R) 239. 
401 Ibid 311 [144] (Chan Sek Keong CJ); Ramalingam Ravinthran v Attorney-General [2012] SLR 
59, 67 [43]. 
402 For example in Inmates of Attica Correctional Facility v Nelson A Rockefeller, 477 F 2d 375, 
379-380  (1973);  United  States  v  Cox,  342  F2d  171  (1965);  United  States  v  Christopher  Lee 
Armstrong, 517 US 456 (1996);  In United States v Chemical Foundation, 71 LEd 131 (1926) it 
was held that ‗[t]he presumption of regularity supports‘ their prosecutorial decisions and, ‗in the 
absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their 
official duties‘. 59 
 
whether he was acting alone or in concert with other offenders), the Attorney-
General does so in accordance with the law. In other words, the courts should 
presume that the Attorney-General‘s prosecutorial decisions are constitutional or 
lawful until they are shown to be otherwise. 
 
Prosecutorial discretion however, is not without its limits. The Court reiterated the 
position in Chng Suan Tze v Minister for Home Affairs that all legal powers are 
subject to limits.
403 An inherent limitation on the prosecutorial power is that it 
may not be exercised arbitrarily, and may only be used for the purpose for which 
it was granted and not for any extraneous purpose.
404 However, in cases where 
several offenders are involved in the same or similar offences committed in the 
same criminal enterprise, the Attorney-General may take into account a myriad of 
factors in determining whether or not to charge an offender and what charges are 
to be brought. These factors include the legal guilt of the offender, the moral 
blameworthiness, the gravity of the harm caused, the question of whether there is 
sufficient evidence against the offender and his /her co-offenders (if any), their 
personal circumstances, the willingness of one offender to testify against his co -
offenders and other policy factors.
405 Where relevant, these factors may justify 
offenders in the same criminal enterprise being prosecuted differently.
406  
 
Insofar  as  the  equa lity  provisions  of  Article  12(1)  of  the  constitution  are 
concerned, it is sufficient that the Attorney-General gives unbiased consideration 
to every offender and avoids taking into account any irrelevant consideration.
407 
This, coupled with the presumption o f legality and constitutionality that the 
Office of the Attorney-General enjoys necessitates that any claim for a breach the 
equality  provisions  of  Article  12(1)  of  the  Constitution  adduce  prima  facie 
evidence of the contrary. Without this, the legality an d constitutionality of the 
Attorney-General‘s decisions in prosecutions are presumed, and the courts should 
be slow to interfere with this. 
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As argued, it would seem that the courts in Singapore have upheld the ‗legal 
erection  of  a  high  and  virtually  impregnable  barrier  around  the  Attorney-
General‘s  constitutional  prerogative  [of]  prosecutorial  discretion‘,
408  similar  to 
comparable commonwealth jurisdictions.
409 The presumption of constitutionality 
and legality afforded to the Attorney-General imposes additional burden for the 
aggrieved accused and given the courts reluctance to interfere with the Attorney -
General‘s  prosecutorial  discretion,  it  may  be  necessary  to  examine  whether 
safeguards to prosecutorial discretion may be found elsewhere. 
 
D Guiding the Discretion 
 
Discretion can dangerously be synonymous with unchecked power.
410 The worry 
is that the prosecutor, being only human, is subject to the imperfections of human 
nature that may be reflected in the choices made.
411  Research suggests that 
prosecutors may bring to bear their personal  biases in the exercise of their 
discretion.
412 It is the ‗personal synthesis of factors by the decision maker‘
413 and 
as  such  can  often  be  secretive  and  unaccountable.  Unbridled  prosecutorial 
discretion  ‗makes  easy  the  arbitrary,  the  discriminatory  and  the  oppressive.  It 
produces ‗inequality of treatment…and offers a fertile bed for corruption‘.
414  
 
Even if it were to be assumed, optimistically, that the discretion would at all times 
be  exercised  in  good  faith  and  with  honesty,  the  decision  to  prosecute  often 
involves evidential or legal issues that are matters of professional judgment and 
inevitably involve a degree of subjectivity.
415 Accordingly, different prosecutors 
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Law Watch Commentary 2. 
410 Simons, above n 21, 899. 
411 Davis, above n 32; Poulin, above n 30, 1072. 
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University Law Review 669, 685-91; Poulin, above n 30, 1080. 
413 Refshauge, above n 26, 359. 
414 Charles D Breital, ‗Controls in Criminal Law Enforcement‘ (1960) 27 University of Chicago 
Law Review 427, 429. 
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may  take  different  perspectives  on  a  matter.
416  One  senior  prosecutor 
acknowledges that the prosecution service is a ‗human institution‘
417 and ‗no-one 
makes  correct  decisions  all  of  the  time‘,
418  further  noting  that  cases  with 
circumstantial  evidence  can  often  lead  to  different  inferences  and  different 
perspectives can lead to different decisions.
419 
 
Finally, there is the issue of perception and public confidence in the criminal 
justice system. Prosecutorial discretion must not be only be exercised in good 
faith, free of personal, emotional and political influences, but must be s een to be 
so. Its exercise must be seen to   be  consistent  with  some fair and transparent 
standards. There must be a ‗minimum level‘ of transparency and accountability in 
accordance with society‘s demands. This would in turn lend confidence to the 
notion that prosecutorial discretion is more than the mere arbitrary will of the 
prosecutor. 
 
The situation begets the question: given the prosecutor‘s status as ‗gate keeper‘ of 
the criminal justice system and the potential of the discretion to effect justice or 
injustice, what safeguards are in place to ensure the exercise of this discretion is 
carried out and seen to be carried out with consistency and not used capriciously 
or even maliciously? How does one ensure that it is ‗not arbitrary, vague and 
fanciful, but legal and regular… and exercised within the limit to which an honest 
man, competent in the discharge of his/her office ought to confine himself?‘
420 
 
1 Prosecutorial Guidelines 
 
In a statement made by Sir Hartley Shawcross, the then Attorney-General of the 
UK, before the House of Commons: 
 
                                                                                                                                     
House  of  Commons  Justice  Committee,  The  Crown  Prosecution  Service:  Gatekeeper  of  the 
Criminal Justice System: Ninth Report of Session 2008-2009 (2009) 44-47 which comments on 
the lack of consistency in the Crown Prosecution Service.  
416 Ibid. 
417 Lievore, above n 50, 6. 
418 Ibid. 
419 Ibid. 
420 Sharp v Bishop of Wakefield [1981] 1 AC 173, 179 (Lord Halsbury). 62 
 
It has never been the rule in this country – I hope it will never be – that suspected 
criminal offences must automatically be the subject of prosecution. Indeed, the 
very  first  regulation  under  which  the  Director  of  Public  Prosecution  worked 
provided that he should intervene to prosecute, amongst other cases: 
‗wherever it appears that the offence or the circumstances of its commission is or 
are of such a character that a prosecution in respect thereof is required in the 
public interest‘. 
That is the dominant consideration…
421 
 
While the statement was made for an English audience, the statement has been 
referred to by commentators in Australia and has been influential in shaping the 
prosecutorial  landscape  in  Australia.
422  This  has  translated  into  the  initial 
conceptualization of two elements: first, is there sufficient evidence to justify a 
prosecution and second, is such a prosecution necessary in the public interest? 
423 
 
(a) The Evidentiary Sufficiency 
 
The first element of ‗sufficient evidence‘ has been the source of some contention. 
Upon initial interpretation, it was ‗fashionable‘ for this to mean a prima facie 
case.
424 This approach was however, unsatisfactory as it was evident that a mere 
prima facie case was often insufficient for a jury to find a guilty verdict.
425 Given 
the growing number, and length of criminal trials, it was felt that to commit 
limited resources to cases that would not likely see a conviction was , at best, 
unwise.
426  Thus,  by  the  mid-1980s  the  switch  to   a  ‗reasonable  prospect  of 
conviction‘ standard was thought to be more appropriate as it conserved limited 
resources and lowered the risk that an innocent person would be prosecuted.
427 
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A  ‗reasonable  prospect  of  conviction‘
428  was  thus  deemed  to  be  a  more 
appropriate  test.  This  was  interpreted  as  ‗rather  more  likely  than  not  that  the 
prosecution will result in a conviction‘,
429 or the ‗51% rule‘.
430 In the application 
of this test, the prosecutor must not only consider whether or not the court would 
convict based on the evidenced adduced by the prosecution, but must also take 
into account the impact of any likely defence, the impact of any witnesses on the 
jury and a number of factors that could affect the outcome of a trial in order to 
determine whether or not the prosecution, if initiated, would ‗more likely than 
not‘ result in conviction.
431 This test was criticized as in some cases, a prosecutor, 
no matter how experienced, will simply be unable to say whether a conviction or 
acquittal is the more likely result.
432 This ‗51%‘ rule can also pose a problem in 
sexual assault cases, where it is often a matter of ‗he said versus she said‘, falling 
short of the necessary 51% threshold.
433 In the 1986 guidelines, an attempt was 
thus made to rectify the issues by subsuming the sufficiency of evidence test with 
‗public interest considerations‘ so that whether a conviction was the more likely 
result  became  the  dominant  factor  in  determining  whether  the  public  interest 
required a prosecution.
434 This approach however, was also unsatisfactory as the 
incorporation  of  the  sufficiency  of  evidence  test  with  public  interest 
considerations was deemed artificial and difficult to apply in practice.
435 
 
So it was in the 1990 version of the guidelines  that the Commonwealth adopted 
the view taken b y the Victorian Shorter Trials Committee.
436  The Committee 
found that the ‗reasonable prospects of conviction‘ should not be equated with a 
51% chance of conviction being sustained. It may be something less than that and 
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is  not  appropriately  expressed  in  mathematical  terms‘.
437  Additionally,  the 
‗reasonable prospect of conviction‘ test was the test adopted by the Victorian and 
New South Wales Directors of Public Prosecution, and at a general meeting of 
State and Territory Directors of Public Prosecutors, it was thought desirable for 
all jurisdictions to operate under this same test.
438 
 
(b) The Public Interest 
 
A second set of considerations is often also taken into account in the exercise of a 
prosecutor‘s  discretion.  This  asks  that  the  prosecutor  to  look  at  possible 
mitigating factors not adequately presented in the substantive law.
439 These extra-
evidential factors are known as ‗public interest‘ considerations,
440 and also found 
their way in the uniform guidelines in Australia.
441 The cases envisaged are often 
ones where the harmfulness of the conduct was relatively low, or where the 
offender‘s  culpability  was  low,  including  cases  of  ‗genuine  mistake  or 
misunderstanding‘  or  where  the  offender  is  elderly  or  suffers  from  a  mental 
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illness. Given the theory of proportionality,
442 it is considered not in the public 
interest to institute full prosecution against these individuals,
443  
 
However, it is important to note that these ‗public interest‘ considerations are the 
next step of a two-stage process. The prosecutor must first be satisfied that there 
is a ‗reasonable prospect of securing a conviction‘. If this test is not met, public 
interest  considerations,  no  matter  how  compelling,  are  irrelevant.
444  The  12 
factors featured in the guidelines include matters such as the seriousnes s or 
triviality of the offence, aggravating or mitigating circumstances, age, medical 
condition, prevalence or obsolescence of the offence, consequences of conviction, 
cost  and  expenses  of  a  trial  and  public  confidence  in  the  criminal  justice 
system.
445  These  guidelines  also  provide  for  the  institution  and  conduct  of 
prosecutions,
446 the control of prosecutions,
447 including their discontinuance,
448 
declining to proceed after committal,
449 indemnities,
450 charge bargaining
451 and 
the choice of charges to be laid.
452 
 
2 The Effect of Prosecutorial Guidelines 
 
In Australia, the primary mechanism for the control of discretion by prosecutors 
to ensure its fair and accountable exercise is in the form of publicly promulgated 
guidelines.
453 This is largely in line with the  United Nations Guidelines on the 
Role of Prosecutors requiring prosecutors vested with discretionary functions to 
provide guidelines for the exercise of such powers so as to ensure consistency and 
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fairness in the exercise of the discretion.
454 As noted by McKechnie, a written 
prosecution  policy  is  an  ‗important  keystone  of  independence‘.
455  A  set  of 
guidelines enable a degree of objectivity to be brought to the decision-making 
process and independence is confirmed if the decision maker is able to justify a 
decision in accordance with previously published material.
456  
 
(a) The Legal Effect 
 
While courts seem to encourage the development and promulgation of guidelines 
to assist in decision making,
457 the legal effect and enforceability of prosecutorial 
guidelines in Australia is not entirely clear as there has yet been any significant 
judicial decision by Australian courts on the matter.
458 They are not delegated 
legislation, merely ‗rules of law‘,
459 and thus sit in an area of legal ambiguity.
460 
There are however, certain genera l principles that can be drawn. Firstly, the 
guidelines must be lawful in the sense that they do not include considerations 
incompatible with their enabling statute,
461  or  other legislation (such as, for 
example,  racial  discrimination  legislation) ,  or  preclu de  the  consideration  of 
clearly relevant considerations.
462  Guidelines  that  fetter  the  decision  maker‘s 
discretion by leaving no room for the exercise of the discretion are legislative in 
nature and infringe upon the legal principle that administrative authorities should 
not legislate unless express authorization to do so is provided for.
463 The courts 
have held that the discretion must not be exercised in blind adherence to policy,
464 
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especially where the case in question requires individualized judgment,
465 as is 
the case with prosecutorial discretion.
466  
 
The non-compliance with prosecutorial guidelines may result in the decision 
being  rendered  null  and  void  for  failure  to  take  into  account  relevant 
considerations.
467  This  may  however,  be  subject  to  privative  clause s.  For 
example, section 25(3) of the  Director of Public Prosecutions Acts 1990 (NT) 
states that the Director shall not be called into question on the ground of a failure 
to comply with published guidelines.
468 Additionally, the courts have shown a 
general reluctance to subject prosecutorial decisions to judicial review as was held 
in the case of Maxwell v The Queen.
469 
 
In the UK, however, in R v Chief Constable of the Kent County Constabulary; Ex 
parte L (a minor),
470 it was held that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion not to 
prosecute was subject to judicial review, but only if the decision was made with 
no consideration of or contrary to the established guidelines.
471 Similarly, in R v 
Inland Revenue Commissioner; Ex parte Mead,
472 it was held that a member of 
the public had a legitimate expectation that the prosecution would follow its own 
published guidelines.
473  Additionally,  in  R  v  Commissioner  of  Police  of  the 
Metropolis;  Ex  parte  Blackburn,
474  it was held that a policy decision no t to 
prosecute  certain  gambling  establishments  were,  in  principle,  reviewable  if 
Wednesbury unreasonableness could be made out.
475 
 
As such, while the Australian courts have yet to indicate any definitive position 
on the legal effect of prosecutorial guidelines, it can at least be argued that they 
may be inclined to lean towards the English approach based on common law and 
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principles of administrative law,
476 thus providing the aggrieved accused at least 
some basis for a challenge.  In reality of course, this ma y be difficult to prove 
given the broad nature of the guidelines. 
 
(b) The Practical Effect 
 
In Australia, prosecutorial guidelines are publicly accessible through the website 
of the various Directors of Public Prosecutors,
477 and in their annual reports.
478 Its 
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accessibility  facilitates  plea  negotiations  between  the  prosecution  and  defence 
counsel (or the accused, if unrepresented).
479 Similarly, while it is arguable that 
the public  availability  of  these  documents  allows for  public  scrutiny  of  the 
guidelines,  offers  some  form  of  accountability  of  the  prosecutors  operating 
throughout  the  States  and  Territories,
480  and  ensures  that  prosecutors  act  in 
accordance with these guidelines, this was not always the accepted position. In a 
Law Reform Commission Paper   by Cashman and Rizzo, it was noted by a 
prosecuting officer that while prosecutorial guidelines were necessary for the 
guidance of persons who have to make decisions on prosecutions, no useful 
purpose could be served by publicly stating what those guidelines are.
481 It was 
further argued that positive harm might result from the public availability of the 
guidelines by allowing greater scope for delay and other tactics by the accused.
482 
Sallmann also acknowledges that prosecutors may be reluctant to declare such 
guidelines in a public way as it would make their jobs more difficult.
483 The 
suggestion is that while prosecutorial guidelines may be useful, their internal 
circulation is sufficient and it is neither necessary nor appropriate to have them 
publicly promulgated. This warning was however not followed through and in 
1982  the  Commonwealth  Attorney -General  tabled  a  statement  of  the 
Commonwealth‘s Prosecution Policy in the Senate.
484 Today the guidelines of the 
respective Directors of Public Prosecution are easily accessible to anyone with 
internet access.
485 Its practical effect is to allow for a degree of public scrutiny 
and accountability of prosecutorial decisions. At the very least, it alerts the public 
to the very existence of prosecutorial discretion.
486 
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In  Singapore,  Ramalingam
487  brought  to  light  the  very  real  and  serious 
consequences  of  prosecutorial  discretion,  especially  in  a  system  with  the 
mandatory death penalty. The case has increased public scrutiny of prosecutorial 
discretion and has raised a series of discussion points for the Singapore criminal 
justice system, one of which is whether there should be greater transparency of 
the prosecution service and ancillary to that, whether the public promulgation of 
prosecutorial  guidelines  and  disclosure  of  reasons  for  prosecutorial  decisions 
would serve to ensure consistency in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion so as 
to instill greater public confidence in the criminal justice system.   
 
While  internal  guidelines  exist  to  ensure  consistency,
488  unlike the Australian 
model, these are not published  in Singapore and the Attorney-General does not 
generally explain his prosecutorial decisions. However, it has been mentioned that 
the Attorney-General and his/her officers would 'consider a large number of often 
competing interests, including those of the victim, the accused person and society 
as a whole'.
489 Singapore‘s Attorney-General, Sundaresh Menon
490 has spoken out 
against the publication of prosecutorial guidelines stating that it would ‗hamper 
[the] discretion rather than promoting anything in particular‘.
491 There is also a 
risk  that  defendants  might  'mount  challenges  against  prosecutorial  decisions, 
leading to a rise in satellite litigation, among other things'.
492 When queried on 
what  ‗public  interest‘  considerations  are  and  how  they  would  factor  in  any 
prosecutorial decisions, the Attorney-General responded: 
 
An integral part of every prosecutorial decision is consideration of the public 
interest. This is an easy formulation or label but it is very difficult to explain 
exactly what it means or how it plays out in practice. It is certainly never a matter 
of being populist. So I don't regard it as a legitimate part of the A-G's function to 
pick his prosecution priorities or shape his policies by his sense of what would be 
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popular to the public or a particular segment of it. The public interest connotes 
the fact that when a prosecutor makes a charging decision he or she is doing so in 
an expression of his or her assessment of what society's response to the crime 
that has been committed should be. This can be a very complex assessment. 
Among other things, you need to be aware of what is happening in society in 
order to form some of these views. There is no grid or formula that you apply in 
coming to a decision. You fall back on the internal guidelines that have been 
devised to provide guidance for such decisions.
493 
 
Thus,  while  the  Attorney-General‘s  Chambers  (‗AGC‘)  has  mentioned  that 
internal guidelines are referred to,
494 the argument is that not publishing them 
would give more flexibility to depart from the guidelines where the ‗interests of 
justice calls  for this  in  any  given case, while keeping to  a broadly  consistent 
path‘,
495 as the nature of prosecutorial discretion can ‗rarely be dealt with in a 
mechanistic or mathematical way‘.
496 Furthermore, with the inevitable resource 
constraints, the AGC has to prioritise the prosecution of offences and it takes into 
account enforcement priorities, among other things.
497 Publishing guidelines, it 
has been contended, may allow for potential offenders to identity prosecution 
priorities and areas where the prosecution would exercise  restraint and this may 
result in offenders being more ‗incentivized to commit such crimes expecting that 
they would probably not face the full force of the law‘.
498 
 
K Shanmugam, the Singapore Minister for Law, has also come out in support of 
non-disclosure. In response to an opposition Member of Parliament‘s query on the 
issue,  the  Minister  acknowledged  the  safeguards  that  public  disclosure  can 
facilitate but highlighted the trade-offs that would come, inevitably, as a result: 
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[S]hould we change the system? I think really we need to start with a context 
here – what is the kind of criminal justice system that we want. We want a 
system where the guilty are convicted, the innocent are acquitted and the wider 
interests of society are protected, which includes the protection of society from 
those  who  could  cause  it  harm.  If  it  is  clear  that  public  disclosure  by  the 
Attorney-General, of his reasons why differential treatment is being given, will 
improve the criminal justice system, then it is a no-brainer; we must make sure 
that the law requires such disclosure. 
  
So the question is, is that clear? The reality is that the position is not so clear. 
There are trade-offs, as Members know. What are the trade-offs here? If reasons 
underlying prosecutorial decisions are revealed, it can compromise intelligence 
and other confidential sources that inform such decisions, which, as I said earlier, 
the Court of Appeal recognised. And, let us not kid ourselves, you will have some 
criminals who will try and work around the guidelines and game the system. That 
is in the nature of, not everyone, but there will be some people who will do that. 
In the United Kingdom, as I am sure Mr Singh is aware, there was a case where a 
person applied to court, for the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) to disclose 
in  advance,  the  guidelines  that  would  inform  the  DPP‘s  decision  whether  an 
offence which was going to be committed, would be prosecuted. So, I am going 
to do this, you tell me in advance – because you have published the guidelines – 
whether I will be prosecuted or not.
499 
 
These comments echo the concern about the possibility of an abuse of the system 
by the accused. The Minister‘s caution that ‗you will have some criminals who 
will try and work around the guidelines and game the system‘,
500 is in many ways, 
reminiscent of the warning sounded in Australia by the Cashman and Rizzo Law 
Reform  Commission  Paper,
501  that  the  public  availability  of  prosecutorial 
guidelines not only served no useful purpose, but may provide a larger scope for 
accused persons to use to their advantage through delaying tactics which would 
subsequently result in justice not being served and undermine public confidence 
in the criminal justice system. 
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It would appear then, that there are two competing interests in this debate. The 
first, a necessary check to ensure the prosecutor exercises his discretion in good 
faith, consistently and correctly. The second, the need to ensure the efficient and 
speedy administration of justice - that there is less scope that accused persons 
could take advantage of to use for tactical reasons to escape justice. 
 
The  earlier  caution  noted  in  Cashmen  and  Rizzo‘s  Law  Reform  Commission 
Report has been supported somewhat by the comments of at least one DPP noting 
that ‗not all decisions…can be readily explained to the public‘,
502 citing the risk 
of compromising witness credibility or evidence.
503  Despite this, the preferred 
approach in Australia, as demonstrated by the significant steps taken to establish 
the respective  Offices of the Director of Pub lic Prosecutions and the public 
availability of uniform guidelines is apparent. Such is the price that Australia was 
willing to pay to ensure a more  publicly accountable system.
504  In Singapore, 
efficient and speedy administration of justice takes priority, and as such, a system 
of internal guidelines and processes is not only sufficient, but appropriate. Here, 
the  ‗unspoken  value  judgment‘  of  the  Singapore  legal  and  cultural  system  is 
evident.
505 It is the reverse of the aphorism that it is better to let 10 guilty persons 
go free than to convict one innocent one.
506  Upon weighing the risk that the 
prosecution acts wrongly or maliciously against the risk of the ‗compromise of 
intelligence and all other attendant risks if disclosure is made‘,
507 the former, as 
the Minister for Law states, is the lesser of the two risks.
508 
 
With this model however, Singapore deprives itself of the practical and legal 
benefits publicly available prosecutorial guidelines offers. The system of internal 
guidelines and processes, even if adequate, relies on a high level of trust in the 
Attorney-General and the various prosecutors under his/her charge. There is little 
transparency and public scrutiny of the matter, and where these suffer, arguably, 
so too does public confidence in the system.  Additionally,  while  Australia‘s 
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judicial position on its own prosecutorial guidelines is less than clear, as argued, 
the  public  availability  of  the  guidelines  not  only  offers  some  level  of 
transparency, but also may allow for a greater scope for an aggrieved accused to 
challenge a prosecutorial decision. The Singapore system does not allow for this, 
but as has been made clear, this is apparently the desired effect. 
 
VI THE TWO MODELS EXAMINED: PRAGMATISM VS PRINCIPLE 
 
Australia‘s  preference  for  transparency  and  accountability  in  their  system  of 
prosecution is apparent. As discussed, Singapore has taken a markedly different 
approach. In order to better understand this Singaporean approach to prosecution, 
it  may  be  useful  to  examine  the  ‗unspoken  value  judgment‘  of  Singapore. 
Singapore  is  blessed,  or  some  might  say  cursed,  with  an  overwhelming 
commitment to pragmatism.
509 This pragmatic approach is evinced in government 
and  policy,  but  arguably  more  so  in  areas  of  the  criminal  law  and  its 
administration.
510 Some contend that this could be due to ‗Asian values‘
511 that 
places the priorities of an ordered society over the needs of individual rights.
512 
Hor goes on to make the point that moral discourse in Singapore does not feature 
prominently  in official decision making in the context of criminal justice.
513 
Rather, a rigid cost-benefit analysis is applied and if the cost of effective criminal 
deterrence necessitates the accidental punishment of innocent persons, then so be 
it.
514 Human rights advocates are quick to criticize this, but the Singapore model 
is  perhaps  not  so  much  a  system  of  deliberate  government  repression  (or 
oppression), but merely a ‗stark utilitarian calculus‘.
515   
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A The Two Models of Criminal Processes 
 
One can examine the criminal justice system against the two models illustrated by 
Professor Parker.
516 In his article, Parker refers to these as the ‗Crime Control 
model‘  and  the  ‗Due  Process  model‘.
517  These  models  serve  to  provide  a 
normative  guide  as  to  what  values  might  affect  the  criminal  law  and  its 
administration.
518 
 
1 The Due Process Model 
 
Parker describes the Due Process model as an ‗obstacle course‘.
519 It is designed 
at  each  level  to  provide  formidable  impediments  to  carrying  the  accused  any 
further along its process in the hopes that no innocent accused is wrongly taken 
down the path. This has led some critics to claim it denies the social desirability 
of repressing crime, though this is not the case.
520 However, the Due Process 
model  does  reject  the  heavy  reliance  on  the  abil ities  of  investigative  and 
prosecutorial  authorities  in  favour  an  informal,  non -adjudicative  fact-finding 
process  that  stresses the possibility  of  human fallibility,  acknowledging  that 
players in the administration of the criminal law can and do make mista kes and 
powers given to public officials can be abused.
521 
 
Its ideology gives primacy to the rights of the individual against those of the 
community or the state.
522  Under this model, civil liberties are accorded the 
highest priority and the underlying goal of the system can be summed up with the 
proposition that it is better to let ten guilty men go free than convict an innocent 
defendant.
523 
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2 The Crime Control Model 
 
If the Due Process model is an obstacle course, the Crime Control model is an 
assembly line.
524 It is based on the proposition that the repression of criminal 
conduct is the most important function to be performed by the criminal process.
525 
The failure to bring criminal conduct under tight control is viewed as leading to 
the  breakdown  of  public  orde r,  leading  to  the  victimization  of  law -abiding 
citizens by law-breakers.
526 Thus, with the ‗credo of justice with efficiency‘,
527 
the Crime Control model demands a high rate of apprehension and calls for a 
swift and successful convictions not by through the adjudication of the courts, but 
with a guilty plea.
528 There must be speed and finality in the conclusion of these 
matters and this may necessitate minimizing the occasion for challenge and 
removing the clutter of ceremonious rituals or obstacles that do not a dvance the 
progress of a case. 
 
This in turn, places a high degree of trust in the efficiency of the criminal 
processes, and the officials administering that process. Police and prosecutors act 
as early determinators of probable guilt or innocence.
529 The probably innocent 
are screened out and the probably guilty quickly passed to the remaining stages of 
the process.
530 Once this determination is made and sufficient evidence of guilt 
found so that an accused should be held for further action, they are treated a s 
probably guilty even before final adjudication by the court.
531 It is assumed that 
this early determination of guilt made by reliable officials then allows for the 
remaining stages of the criminal process to be merely perfunctory, facilitating 
efficiency. 
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B The Models in Relation to Prosecutorial Discretion 
 
1 Australia 
 
In some ways, Australia‘s significant efforts at ensuring safeguards, checks and 
balances in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion by way of the establishment of 
the independent office of the DPP, and the public promulgation of guidelines to 
afford better transparency evinces elements of the Due Process model. Australia 
acknowledges the fallibility of its public officers charged with the administration 
of justice and thus makes an attempt to ensure the protection of civil liberties. 
These efforts however, would hardly be appreciated by the Crime Control model 
which would likely deem these as obstacles and ceremonious rituals that merely 
give  greater  scope  for  challenges  resulting  in  an  inefficient  and  undesirable 
criminal justice system. 
 
2 Singapore 
 
Singapore on the other hand, demonstrates a number of traits one might find in 
the  Crime  Control  model,  as  suggested  by  then  Attorney-General  Chan  Sek 
Keong,
532 particularly if one uses the following three factors as indicators: (1) the 
high percentage of cases disposed of through guilty pleas, (2) the insignificant 
number of cases where miscarriages of justice have been raised in public; and 
finally  (3)  Singapore‘s  low  crime  rate.  Singapore‘s  model  relies  on  internal 
procedures and safeguards which in turn depend on a high level of trust in the 
Public Prosecutor and his Deputies to ensure prosecutorial discretion is exercised 
consistently  and  fairly.  It  can  be  contended  that  its  high  conviction  rates  is 
demonstrative of the success of the Crime Control model – an early determination 
of the probably guilty have already been made, rendering the remaining processes 
perfunctory. As such, the adoption of pragmatism with a stark utilitarian calculus 
is  perhaps  a  conscious  attempt  by  Singapore  to  ensure  the  criminal  process 
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performs as it was meant to, ensuring the elimination, or at least severe reduction 
in criminal conduct. 
 
C Efficacy 
 
While it would not be proper for a prosecution service to push for a conviction at 
all costs, it has generally been accepted that conviction rates may be used as one 
measure of a prosecution service‘s effectiveness.
533  Conviction rates may thus be 
used to compare the effectiveness of the prosecution services in Australia and 
Singapore.
534  Western  Australia‘s  percentage  of  conviction  after  trial  is 
approximately 61%,
535 and Singapore‘s rate is 92% for Subordinate Court matters 
and  approximately  82%  for  High  Court  matters.
536  This  discrepancy  is  a 
significant  one  and  consi dering  the  different  models  of  criminal  processes 
adopted by the two countries, it is perhaps unsurprising. Sufficed to say then, 
based on this, if the aim of a criminal justice system is to secure a high conviction 
rate, then the pragmatic approach prefer red by Singapore and illustrated by the 
Crime Control model, with greater prosecutorial discretion will facilitate this 
objective.  
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VII A CHANGING TIDE IN RECENT TIMES? 
 
Pragmatism is one thing, political palatability quite another. As one author aptly 
puts it: 
 
[w]ith the seemingly unstoppable march of so-called international human rights 
developments in most places in the world, and the ever-increasing public appetite 
for political accountability and transparency here and elsewhere, there may come 
a time when the state (more specifically, the Attorney-General) has to confront 
the question as to whether it has to or should recalibrate the balance it has struck 
between  its  (extremely  challenging)  task  of  prosecuting  crime  and  its 
commitment to protecting the right to presumption of innocence 
537 
 
As  calls  for  political  accountability  grows,  it  may  not  be  a  stretch  of  the 
imagination to see Singapore‘s gradual shift from its pragmatic approach towards 
at least some elements of the Due Process model. While Singapore‘s dominant 
People‘s Action Party has been returned overwhelmingly to government in every 
election since the founding of the nation-state, dissatisfaction with its ‗pragmatic‘ 
and ‗stark utilitarian‘ approaches is  gradually but  readily discernable.  Its once 
unimpeachable popular mandate has been eroded most notably in the most recent 
General Election, where an opposition party was for the first time able to secure a 
Group  Representative  Constituency,
538  sending  five  of  its  members  into 
Parliament.
539 This is perhaps insignificant in most Western liberal democracies, 
but  in  Singapore,  where  the  People‘s  Action  Party  has  enjoyed  virtually 
unchallenged popularity and is often synonymous with the State itself, this may 
be an indicator of discontent with the system. In light of this, a number of political 
issues, including prosecutorial discretion have been cast into the limelight and 
subject to public scrutiny. There is arguably a public concern that Singapore has 
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not attained a ‗minimum level‘ – a level of transparency and accountability in the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion that society finds acceptable. The failure to 
find this ‗minimum level‘ may then lead to a loss of public confidence in the 
criminal justice system. This has resulted in number of brave new changes in the 
criminal law landscape which seems contrary to the Crime Control model. These 
changes appear to be attempts to reduce the prosecutor‘s discretion, or at least 
make the process more transparent, recalibrating the fine balancing act required in 
prosecutorial discretion. 
 
A Amendments to the Disclosure Regime 
 
Until recently, the criminal disclosure process in Singapore was as some would 
claim,  stacked  against  the  accused  and  has  been  the  subject  of  considerable 
criticisms by academics and the criminal bar.
540 For example, the prosecution was 
entitled to interrogate and obtain statements from the accused without having his 
lawyer or any other third party present. The prosecution  was also not required to 
disclose any prosecution witness st atements.
541 The criminal discovery process 
was informal
542 and requests for information helpful to the defence were rarely 
acceded to.
543 In both Tay Koh Poh Ronnie
544 and Selvarajan James,
545 the Court 
found a minimal duty of disclosure on the prosecution.  This posed considerable 
obstacles  for the accused and his counsel. Defence counsel often received an 
unpleasant surprise when proceeding upon the basis that the accused has made no 
incriminating statements only to learn later that their clients have made an earlier 
confession  to  the  police.  As  Winslow  contends,  this  not  only  undermines 
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counsel‘s preparation of the defence but does no credit to the administration of 
justice in the State.
546 
 
Taking effect in 2 January 2011, the amendments in the Criminal Procedure Code 
have since gone some ways in redressing the balance between the state and the 
defence.
547 Notable changes have included an attempt to formalize the disclosure 
framework by way of Part IX of the Act, which requires the prosecution to furnish 
all statements made by the accused at any time, even where such statements 
would only be useful to the defence.
548 Where the prosecution fails to comply 
with the discovery obligations, the Court may order a discharge not amounting to 
an acquittal in relation to the charge.
549 However, under both the old and revised 
Criminal Procedure Cores, there is obligation on the prosecution to disclose any 
kind of unused material.
550 This changed with the case of Kadar, where the Court 
of  Appeal  analyzed  the  disclosure  obligations  in  a  range  of  jurisdictions, 
including  Kirby  J‘s  judgment  in  Mallard,
551  and  imported  a  more  onerous 
common  law  duty  of  disclosure  on  the  prosecution.
552  These  changes  are 
significant in leveling the playing field. 
 
B Public Prosecutor v Wu Tze Liang Woffles 
 
An  example  illustrating  this  gradual  movement  is  the  case  of  Woffles  Wu. 
Prominent surgeon Dr Woffles Wu was charged and fined $1000 under section 
81(3) of the Road Traffic Act
553 for abetting an elderly employee in providing 
misleading information to the police for a speeding offence involving his car in 
November  2006.  He  was  given  a  stern  warning  for  a  similar  offence  on  11 
September 2005.
554 There was public outrage at the perceived leniency of the 
sentence and some observers noted that  Wu was charged under section 81(3) of 
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the Road Traffic Act
555 where it is typical for a fine or at most a short custodial 
sentenced  to  be  imposed,
556    when  he could have been charged for the more 
serious offence of perverting the course of justice under section 204A of the 
Penal Code,
557 a far more serious offence with a term of imprisonment of up to 7 
years. He could also have been charged with providing false information with the 
intent to cause a public servant to use his lawful power to the injury of another 
under section 182 of the  Penal  Code.
558  Under the doctrine of prosecutorial 
discretion, prosecutors need not to provide reasons for preferring a particular 
charge and typically do not.
559  
 
There was however continued public discontent with the outcome of the case with 
allegations that lesser charges were preferred due to Wu‘s affluence and social 
position. In light of this, the AGC broke prosecutorial silence and in a formal 
statement, issued reasons for its decision to proceed with the lesser charge.
560 The 
AGC stated that a section 204A charge under the Penal Code was inappropriate 
as the offence was committed in 2006, and section 204A was only enacted in 
2008. The statement also  mentioned that the charge preferred against accused 
persons would be calibrated to reflect the seriousness of the criminal act and the 
fact situation, and based on this it was considered more appropriate to proceed 
with section 81(3) of the Road Traffic Act than invoke general provisions of the 
Penal Code.
561 
 
The case is significant for several reasons. Firstly,  it evinces a growing public 
awareness of the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in the selection of charges 
and the public dissatisfaction of the secrecy that surrounds the process. Secondly, 
the AGC‘s rare move to provide reasons for the charge in light of the public 
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outcry demonstrates an understanding that some transparency in the prosecutor‘s 
decision making process is essential if public confidence in the system is to be 
maintained.  Indeed,  the  formal  issuing  of  reasons  for  preferring  a  particular 
charge is a whole new level of transparency that would not ordinarily be seen 
even in Australia. While it would be foolish to expect prosecutorial reasons for 
every criminal charge, this could entail for greater transparency in controversial 
cases and lay the groundwork for further reform in the area. 
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C Plea Bargaining Reform 
 
The plea bargaining process is also prevalent in Singapore which encompasses a 
similar process of informal negotiations between the accused and prosecutors.
562 
This gives rise to the  same set of problems discussed above, not least of all the 
lack of transparency of the prosecutor‘s discretion in the process. At the opening 
of the Legal Year in 2011,
563 the Chief Justice noted the issue and the Attorney-
General has announced that a revised, more formal framework to plea bargaining 
is currently being considered.
564 This would institutionalize the structure of plea 
bargaining so that it is done not just through informal discussions between 
prosecutor and accused.
565  
 
The changes include a Senior District Judge who will sit in as a neutral mediator 
with Prosecution and Defence Counsel to facilitate discussions on the merits of 
the case,
566 the charges and sentences that may be imposed. This process, referred 
to as ‗Criminal Case Resolution‘,
567 helps parties consider all available options on 
the table. The accused can then elect to do one of three things (1) plead guilty to 
the original charge, (2) plead guilty to  an amended charge, or (3) claim trial. 
Similarly, the prosecutor may choose to drop charges or proceed with amended 
ones. 
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The  3-way  Criminal  Case  Resolution  provides  for  greater  certainty  and 
transparency. The parties are in fact negotiating a guilty plea in return for an 
agreed sentence, whereas under the 2-way process, it may sometimes be difficult 
for  defence  counsel  to  explain  to  the  accused  the  outcome  of  their  case.  The 
presence of a senior judicial officer also acts as an additional check on the process 
and  would  also  likely  instill  greater  public  confidence  in  the  plea  bargaining 
process. While it is still early days in the plea bargaining reform, it does signify a 
shift  to  ensure  greater  visibility  and  transparency  in  the  otherwise  relatively 
secretive process. 
 
D Giving Discretion back to the Courts: Tweaking the Mandatory Death Penalty 
 
Until recently, the mandatory death penalty in Singapore was unapologetically 
extended to a number of offences, most notably homicide and drug related ones. 
For  example,  section  300  of  the  Penal  Code  provides  that  culpable  homicide 
amounts to murder where:
568 
 
(a)  The act by which death is caused is done with the intention of causing death; 
(b) The act is done with the intention of causing such bodily injury as the offender 
knows is likely to cause death; 
(c)  The act is done with intention of causing bodily injury, and such bodily injury is 
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death; and 
(d) The act is done with the knowledge that it is so imminently dangerous that it 
must in all probability cause death, and without any excuse for incurring the risk 
of death. 
 
If any of these charges are proven beyond reasonable doubt, then section 302 
provides for the mandatory imposition of the death penalty.
569 On 9 July 2012, in 
an unprecedented move, the Singapore Government announced that while the 
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death penalty would still be retained for all provisions, only section 300(a) would 
attract the mandatory death penalty.
570 
 
Similarly, section 17 of the  Misuse  of  Drugs  Acts
571  was  as  some  would  say 
‗draconian‘
572 and does not make a distinction between drug lords and mules, thus 
leading to what some would perceive as a gross injustice as was in the recent case 
of Yong Vui Kong.
573 In that case, the mandatory death penalty was imposed 
upon ‗impoverished and vulnerable‘
574 19 year old Yong Vui Kong, little more 
than  a  naïve  drug  mule,  and  thus  supposedly  less  morally  blameworthy.  The 
recent  amendments  now  allow  for  mandatory  death  penalty  to  be  tempered 
somewhat  if  certain  conditions  are  met.  For  example,  where  the  offender‘s 
cooperation with authorities assists in convictions of those further up the drug 
supply chain, the discretionary and not the mandatory death penalty applies.
575 
Additionally, if a mental disability affects the offender‘s ability to understand the 
gravity  of  the  offence,  the  courts  now  have  the  discretion  to  take  this  into 
consideration.
576  
 
For a country that has been unapologetic in its authoritative approach, this move 
is significant and it  will be interesting to witness the effect of these proposed 
amendments upon the criminal law landscape in Singapore. In the contex t of 
homicide offences, while section 300(a) still attracts the mandatory death penalty, 
the reality is that the majority of charges placed by the prosecution against the 
accused revolves around section 300(c),
577 causing death with the intention of 
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causing bodily injury that is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause 
death. This thus potentially shifts the sentencing discretion of the bulk of potential 
homicide cases back into the hands of the judiciary. The death penalty itself of 
course is not abolished, and still remains a viable sentence, but it is no longer 
mandatory and the court will have to exercise their discretion when imposing a 
sentence, taking into account each case‘s individual facts and circumstances. The 
prosecution may still if it so choose elect for a section 300(a) charge, though it is 
of course far more onerous to establish an intention to cause death, than merely an 
intention to cause bodily harm sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause 
death.  
 
The decision on which charge to bring still lies with the Attorney-General. A 
charge under section 300(a) continues to attract the mandatory death penalty if the 
courts find a guilty verdict. This still vests enormous power in the office of the 
Attorney-General, but a charge under any of the other ‗lesser‘ provisions, section 
300 (b), (c), or (d) will allow the court to exercise its discretion, to impose (or not) 
the  death  penalty,  taking  into  account  each  case‘s  individual  facts  and 
circumstances.   
 
The  aforementioned  landmarks  in  the  legal  landscape  of  the  criminal  law  in 
Singapore  could  signify  government  awareness  of  the  growing  public 
dissatisfaction with the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding the exercise 
of prosecutorial discretion. The new measures could be some attempts to balance 
the system – to on the one hand continue to have sufficient discretion so as to 
allow for efficient prosecution of criminal offences, but tempered with the need to 
be  more  transparent  and  publicly  accountable.  These  steps  could  also  be 
Singapore  trying  to  find  and  establish  its  ‗minimum  level‘  of  acceptable 
transparency and accountability in prosecutorial discretion. 
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VIII WHICH WAY FORWARD?: FINAL WORDS 
 
Prosecutorial discretion is an inevitable part of the criminal justice system and 
will not disappear any time soon. The question then is to what extent should the 
discretion be scrutinized and/or restrained so as to balance the competing interests 
of efficiency on the one hand and transparency, independence and fairness on the 
other. Both play integral roles in the administration of justice. The collapse of 
either would result in a decline of public confidence in the criminal process. 
 
If the objective of a prosecution service is to be transparent, independent and fair, 
then Australia has taken significant steps to ensure that the Public Prosecutor and 
the discretion that the Office exercises is such and seen to be such. Is it however a 
perfect  system? Arguably  not,  as  the South  Australian example of  Nemer  has 
demonstrated.  The  retention  of  police  prosecutors  is  also  illustrative  of  the 
resource  constraints  faced  by  the  system.  As  suggested  above,  measures  to 
restrain  the  exercise  of  prosecutorial  discretion  and  processes  to  ensure  its 
transparency that advocates of civil liberties would hail may come at the cost of 
efficiency. Given the ever increasing caseloads that courts are inevitably facing 
and the reality of the criminal justice system, an overzealous approach to these 
measures, while admirable, is perhaps unwise. As one commentator has put it: 
 
[F]or too long those involved in the criminal justice system have been wedded to 
the idea that justice is such a sacrosanct commodity that it virtually has no price. 
One result of this attitude has been, until recently, little demonstration about the 
economics of the criminal trial system…unless new rules are devised which will 
make our criminal justice system more efficient, but no less just, I fear there will 
soon be a time when we will be unable to prosecute certain cases that should be 
prosecuted for the only reason that it would be simply too costly to do so.
578 
 
Singapore and Australia certainly have some similarities – the reluctance of the 
judiciary  to  intervene  in  the  exercise  of  prosecutorial  discretion  for  example, 
which affirms the traditional notion of the separation of powers. However, while 
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Australia‘s model still vests considerable power within its prosecution service, the 
system is marked by a number of attempts to restrain and make the process more 
transparent  and  independent.  These  measures,  indicative  of  the  Due  Process 
model, are a result of historical developments that have thus far fulfilled their 
objectives  of  fairness,  accountability,  independence  and  transparency.  The 
tradeoff  in  efficiency,  which  some  initially  questioned,  has  been  generally 
accepted as necessary.  
 
What  then  does  the  future  hold  for  prosecutorial  discretion  in  Singapore  and 
Australia? Australia appears to be satisfied with its approach thus far, albeit with 
some minor continual adjustments that we may see further down the road, such as 
for example additional transfer of prosecutorial functions from the police to the 
DPP, if resources permit. Nonetheless, Australia has found and established its 
‗minimum  level‘  of  transparency  and  accountability.  Singapore  poses  a  more 
interesting situation. While one may say that it still evinces a firm commitment to 
the  Crime  Control  model  and  would  not  go  as  far  as  promulgating  publicly 
available prosecutorial guidelines or establishing an independent statutory Office 
of Public Prosecutions, it would have been a brave person to have predicted the 
removal of the mandatory death penalty.  
 
This paper offers no conclusive determination on the superiority of one system 
over another. Each system will need to find its own balance, taking into account 
the values of its criminal justice system (and indeed that of society at large). It 
does however offer a caution. Pragmatism has thus far served Singapore well. 
Indeed, as Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong puts it, ‗if the efficiency of a country‘s 
criminal justice system can be measured by its crime rate, then [Singapore‘s] is 
undoubtedly efficient‘.
579 However, as the nation state matures and grows, so too 
will the voices that call for greater transparency and accountability. Singapore 
must find its ‗minimum level‘ of transparency and accountability that society will 
find acceptable. It must take evolving societal demands into account but as it 
embarks  on  its  new  experiment,  it  would  be  wise  to  consider,  and  consider 
seriously,  the  potential  cost  of  the  move.  Prosecutorial  discretion  is  a  fine 
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balancing act, with transparency and accountability on one side and the efficient 
administration of justice on the other. The preference for either one comes at the 
cost of the other. 
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